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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

BY W. W. ROSTOW

LIKE the war to which it succeeds, the present period of diplomacy presents to all nations problems of great novelty. For the United States, however, the Second World War, and the process of peace-making in which it is now caught up, have required a re-definition of its relations to the world unique among the Great Powers. That re-orientation is still in process; and its outcome can by no means be predicted in detail. The evolution of the American position since 1939, sharply marked by Mr. Truman's appeal to Congress for aid to Greece and Turkey, appears to involve changes in the American outlook, and in American foreign policy, long-run in character.

For Russia, France, and Great Britain the recent war constituted a peculiarly violent and dangerous recurrence of national experiences. Russia had known before invasions by land, mounted from the bases of Eastern Europe; nor was this the first occasion on which France had been engulfed by a military force, generated in Central Europe, which poured through the Ardennes, and swept along the North Sea and the Channel Coast. For Britain, the domination of virtually the whole of the Continent by an enemy power was, in fact, more typical of her military history than the pattern of the First World War, with a formal front sustained on the Continent throughout the period of hostilities. The collapse of France in 1940 presented Britain with a desperate, but familiar, problem. There was a sense in which the war in Europe simply confirmed, for British and Europeans, habitual conceptions, deeply bred and transmitted over centuries of human and national experience.

For the United States it was not, of course, new to fight in Europe or to fight Germany. But in many ways the First World War had left the country unmarked. This was not simply a consequence of the brief period or the limited character of American participation in the war of 1914-18. It resulted from the conclusions popularly drawn from that war, and from those that were not drawn. The United States returned to isolation, or more precisely to what has been called a Continental Policy; that is, the pursuit of security within the Western Hemisphere, and virtual disengagement from the major issues of the European and Asiatic Continents. In the schoolboy's lore of the 1920's and 1930's American participation in the First World War was regarded as a glorious, but probably ill-advised, adventure. The implications of that adventure, and the conception of the national interest which had, at bottom, motivated and justified it, were largely forgotten or ignored. And this was almost true of those who continued after 1920 to seek American entrance into the

League of Nations, as those who believed that some version of the Monroe Doctrine should define the outer limit of the American commitment in foreign affairs.

Those who persisted in the Wilsonian tradition argued their case for the most part in general terms of "collective security". It required the fall of France in 1940 and the clear threat of invasion to Great Britain to translate that case into the more persuasive vocabulary of the American national interest. Those two events provided sufficient impetus to support the lend-lease compromise, and a shoot-at-sight policy in Atlantic waters. But in the last analysis the United States went to war only when the enemy chose directly to threaten the continental position with the attack on Hawaii; and the Germans helpfully declared war as well. In short, the United States went to war in December 1941 under a most primitive and direct national challenge, understandable and acceptable to all.

It is, perhaps, worth recalling very briefly the general shape and the traditional main objectives of American diplomacy. The foreign policy of the United States from the onset of the Revolution to the end of the nineteenth century was concerned: with the winning of independence, in which a French alliance, temporarily accepted, played a decisive part; with the expansion to the West, which involved a war with Mexico as well as extensive dealings with France and Spain; with the protracted negotiations which finally established the peaceful Canadian boundary; with the avoidance of British intervention during the American Civil War; with the formulation of relations with Latin America around the somewhat elastic concept of the Monroe Doctrine; and with an extension of the American interest to Alaska and the mid-Pacific islands. In the main, American diplomacy was simply a function, over this century and a quarter, of the larger effort to establish and consolidate an independent continent-nation, and to protect its position in the Western Hemisphere.

In Europe the United States generated consciously no major national interests; its diplomacy was designed to remove or to limit European stakes on the American Continent and in the Western Hemisphere, and to avoid, as Washington had urged, the entanglement of the American destiny "with that of any part of Europe."

In the Far East commercial interests led the United States into fairly elaborate diplomacy, in both China and Japan, even before the Civil War. These interventions yielded a commercial treaty with China, and they opened Japan to the Western World; but the colourful negotiations that produced the Treaty of Wanghia in 1844, and which brought Commodore Perry's seven black ships to the Bay of Yedo in 1854, were not sustained in the last half of the nineteenth century. The United States, largely lost interest. That mid-century passage in American history may well have contributed, however, to the curious tendency to accept intervention in the Far East as a more natural facet of the

American Destiny than intervention in Europe: a tendency which, to some extent, affected American policy in the recent war and which still plays some part in popular thinking and in American diplomacy.

The diplomatic history of the years from 1898 to 1939 can usefully be summarized as a period of experimental groping towards a new relationship of the United States to the rest of the world. The American continent had been consolidated by the 1890's; and the nation looked out upon the seas with a margin of unemployed enterprise and a consciousness of power. It built a navy and toyed inconclusively with the doctrines of Captain Mahan.

There was a fairly continuous passage of imperialism with respect to portions of Latin America, which after yielding a solid result, in the form of the Panama Canal, gave way finally to the Good Neighbour Policy of Roosevelt, Hull and Welles. There was the war with Spain in 1898, which removed that country from Cuba and which left the United States with the difficult and embarrassing problem of the Philippines. There was the First World War, with its barren aftermath. There was the policy of the Open Door in China, and the failure to sustain it in 1931, when neither the United States nor the rest of the world faced the implication that Mr. Stimson then drew from the onset of Japanese aggression.

Reflecting on this record of abortive and bankrupt American initiative in Europe and Asia it is understandable that many Americans should have concluded, in the course of the 1930's, that the country should undertake no serious international commitments outside the Western Hemisphere. In any case, such was the controlling national view on the outbreak of war in 1939. On October 3, 1939, the Declaration of Panama established in the Western Hemisphere a 'safety belt' around the Americas, south of Canada, from approximately 300 to 1,000 miles in width, and it warned the belligerents to refrain from naval action within that area. In November 1939 a cash-and-carry policy of arms exports was passed by the Congress, offering some concession to American sympathies, and some modification in the previous Neutrality Act, but designed consciously to avoid the Freedom of the Seas controversy which ultimately effected American entrance into the war of 1914-18. The United States, in this extremity, abandoned a doctrine it had irregularly maintained from the days of Napoleon, the Barbary pirates, and the war of 1812.

Less than a decade later, in the period 1945-47, American military and diplomatic representatives have constituted the occupation authority in Japan, and they have shared the occupation of Korea, Germany, and Austria. An American diplomatic representative in Nanking has stubbornly sought the terms by which a unified China might be established, and even with the failure of the first phase of that effort, the American interest persists. Early in 1946 an American Secretary of State, as a matter of high national policy, insisted on the enforcement of an international agreement relating to Northern Iran; and an American President has more recently defined a long term American

interest in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. A successor to the League of Nations is locating itself in New York City. And these operations have been supported by a very large majority of the American people.

This revolution in diplomatic behaviour may be traced to the more or less conscious acceptance of two related sets of ideas by the American Government and the people. The first of these is essentially military, and the second relates to the balance of power in the Eurasian Continent.

American thinking about the military security of the nation has been successively altered in the past six years by the crisis in the west of 1940-41; the attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941; and then by the dropping of the atom bomb on Hiroshima in August 1945.

The pursuit of a continental policy was always based on the implicit or explicit judgment that, given maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine, a serious military threat to the United States could come only through sea-borne invasion; and that the United States was capable of defending the approaches to the continent against any likely naval coalition. In the course of the great debate over isolationism, in the period 1939-41, much of the argument, in effect, came to rest on this latter point. Many sober converts to intervention were won when they concluded that, over a period of years, with German domination of the European continent and Great Britain, and with the operation of a German-Japanese coalition, the naval defence of the Western Hemisphere would prove impossible.

It is probably fair to conclude that an acceptance of the reality of this threat was decisive to the passage of the Lend-Lease Act early in 1941. It had, at last, become evident that the unstated, and somewhat ironical, premise of American isolationism was a control of the Atlantic which required a friendly British sea-power based on a friendly Britain.

The effect of the disaster at Pearl Harbour was, of course, to provoke a simple and universal determination to impose total defeat upon the Japanese. It had, also, certain consequences which affected both technical and popular thinking: the relative utility in modern war of the battleship and of the aircraft-carrier was dramatized; the threat of direct, if sporadic, air attack on the American continent was raised; and, above all, the concept of isolating the United States from a major war by defensive naval dispositions was placed, perhaps permanently, in disrepute.

The experience of Pearl Harbour, and of the subsequent Eurasian war in which the United States became fully engaged, obviously explains much of the American diplomatic revolution. The terms of that revolution have been driven home and its character significantly altered, however, by the emergence of the very long-range aircraft, guided missiles, and the atom bomb. Without those instruments, it is possible that, as a result of the war, the United States might merely have drawn the conclusion that it must in the future positively and actively dominate the approaches to the American Continent, either itself

with its Allies. It may well have decided that such a positive extension of the old continental doctrine would suffice in the post-war world, and retired, in effect, to some more active version of isolationism.

The new and awful weapons may well, in the last analysis, forestall this outcome. For it lies clearly within the potentialities of modern aircraft and atomic weapons to inflict grievous national damage on the United States from bases deep in Europe or Asia, and to impose such damage by the mobilization of a relatively limited pool of resources, as compared with those required to inflict comparable damage during the Second World War.

Once it is accepted that the United States is capable of being militarily threatened from distant interior air bases the main lines of an appropriate national policy become clear. It consists in:

- 1. maintenance of the ability promptly and effectively to counter-attack any potential enemy who might consider atomic attack on the United States;
- 2. the quest for international agreements which would effectively remove the danger of atomic weapon attack;
- 3. and the quest for both immediate and long-run solutions to problems throughout the world which might lead to war and to the employment of atomic weapons.

It is a thin substitute for the two comforting oceans which were formerly believed to shelter the American continent, to be able to threaten a potential enemy with at least equal counter-attack after he has inflicted serious national injury. The United States has abandoned its island status, in a military and diplomatic sense, with a reluctance the people of Great Britain will understand; but the conclusion of General Marshall, contemplating as Chief of Staff the lessons of the recent war, is likely to be accepted and written firmly into American policy: "It no longer appears practical to continue what we once conceived as hemispheric defence as a satisfactory basis for our security. We are now concerned with the peace of the entire world." The 'respectable defensive picture' counselled a hundred and fifty years earlier by Washington is no longer judged to suffice.

It may appear strange to belabour the realization in the United States that we now must live in a world where real dangers lurk, where military security is not guaranteed by nature. For the people of Europe the recent war and the atom bomb have strengthened a sense of insecurity which has been virtually a continuous part of European life so long as its history is recorded. For the United States this is, relatively, a new element in the national state of mind, and one which, while it was not created by the atom bomb, may well be maintained because of it, when the mood of June 1940 and that of December 1941 become difficult to recapture.

The recent military experience of the United States, and the conclusions drawn from it, may have promoted a willingness to devote a larger proportion of the national energy and resources to the quest for stable peace; but they have not, and they cannot in themselves determine the cast of American policy in the particular regions of Europe and Asia where American diplomacy is

freshly engaged. For Great Britain and France the problems presented by Germany, Austria, and Eastern Europe are basically familiar; and there are, whatever their present worth, traditional formulae of the national interest on which to guide the day-to-day operations of diplomacy. Similarly, the position of Russia in Europe and in Northern Asia, however striking it may be to this generation, is in many ways a reversion. Russian troops have been in Berlin before; and a powerful Russian interest in Eastern Europe, in Manchuria, and in Korea is not new. In the case of the United States, not only the public at large but the Department of State as well have been forced to define the American interest in strange regions under novel circumstances.

It was noted earlier that the revolution in American diplomatic behaviour stemmed both from military judgments and from conclusions drawn concerning the balance of power on the Eurasian Continent. While the debate, so far as the United States is concerned, might not exist at all without the former element, the substance of the debate concerns issues arising from the latter.

The processes of war and of wartime diplomacy placed the United States, by the autumn of 1945, in Berlin and Vienna as a joint occupying power; in half of Korea; virtually alone in Tokyo; and it yielded a rather special, if ambiguous, status for the United States in China. In all those areas, excepting China, American representatives directly confronted the representatives of the Soviet Union; and, further excepting Japan, they confronted them on an equal basis. At all these points, and throughout the Eurasian area, two central observations were made:

1. In all the areas which it occupied or in which its influence was predominant for other reasons the Soviet Union appeared to seek to maximize and to consolidate its national power, partly at the expense of other powers, and to extend Soviet power into neighbouring areas.
2. In the areas where the Soviet Union was seeking to extend its power, economic, social, and political conditions existed to which the Soviet Union, or its local advocates, might effectively appeal.

The vigorous behaviour of Soviet diplomacy, in the unstable setting of the post-war world, seemed to raise, if generously projected, the threat of Soviet domination of the whole Eurasian continent. Should such an outcome materialize, its exact technical significance, in terms of air warfare with atom bombs, is difficult to gauge. In terms of every other standard of national power, however, it would represent a great diminution of the absolute and relative power and influence of the United States in the world. It is, and will probably remain, a major objective of American policy in Europe and in Asia to prevent Soviet domination of the Eurasian continent.

Just as the war revealed that a military policy of hemispheric defence was grounded implicitly in the existence of a powerful and friendly British Navy based in Europe, the diplomacy of the post-war world evoked a realization that a diplomatic policy confined to the Western Hemisphere implicitly assumed the avoidance of a structure in Europe and Asia which would place the Euro-

ean continent, on the one hand, and continental East Asia, on the other, under the dominance of a single, possibly hostile, power. In the two post-war years the threat of such an outcome has appeared real, or potentially real; at some moments in a military sense, but more urgently in terms of the political and economic life of those regions. And the possibilities of avoiding this threat have appeared to depend directly on the maintenance of an active American policy in distant continents. If the war catapulted the United States into Europe and Asia, the atom bomb and Soviet policy are holding it there: the atom bomb because any war would now threaten the United States; Soviet policy because it has been judged to be aggressive with respect to American interests.

In days of pre-atomic warfare the significance of military control of Western Europe and of China was reasonably unambiguous to other major powers, and utterly it was driven home in the United States. Under present circumstances those areas may or may not be for the United States a matter of great military moment, narrowly defined. They are evidently of significance, however, for the non-military power—in the widest meaning, the political power of the United States; and, perhaps more important, their orientation will affect the possibilities of maintaining within the United States the relatively free political and economic life it now enjoys. There is a sense in which the foreign policy of the United States is now mainly concerned to secure the political rather than the military security of the country—in a comfortable phrase, to protect the American way of life. The realization has grown that in defence of the American national interest the United States may or may not face a military war with the Soviet Union; it certainly faces a conflict of political and economic conception and, broadly, of political influence.

Simply to recognize the existence of, and even to respond to, a clash of interest between the Soviet Union and the United States does not, of course, constitute a foreign policy. The formation of policy has required judgment with respect to the nature of that clash, the optimum means for dealing with it, and the manner in which its existence, and even continuance, can be made consistent with our common larger aspirations for a stable peace. It is around these issues of formulation and balance, that the American debate revolves and a foreign policy has been shaped.

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CHINA AGAIN HOPES

By O. M. GREEN

THE New Year festival of 1946 was gladdened for all China by the news that at a conference of all parties in Chungking complete agreement had been reached between Government and Communists. So close an observer as General George Marshall, who as official American mediator was better able to know the facts than anyone, believed that peace had been secured: others might therefore be excused for similar hopefulness. Yet before April the Communists had flung away, declaring that the Kuomintang were secretly working to wreck the agreement and retain their monopoly of power. The war began again, if it had ever stopped, and is still raging. Now, within the past few weeks fresh causes for hopefulness have arisen which, without underrating the dark side of the Chinese picture, are not to be ignored.

It would be tedious to detail the course of the war and indeed impossible. Battles were reported for propaganda purposes, which never took place; negotiations were announced only to flicker out aimlessly; and cease-fires ordered with no cessation of fighting. General Chiang undoubtedly held his hand until July when he evidently decided that further argument unbacked by force was useless. But he waved the olive-branch as well as the big stick, always urging the Communists to accept the still open terms of the Chungking agreement, enter the National Assembly and co-operate peacefully with others.

Throughout the autumn the Communists lost much ground. In December Kalgan fell to the Government troops, a heavy loss as it was the Communists' chief base in north-east China, well-provided with factories built by the Japanese, and the chief link in their communications with their comrades in Manchuria. Then in March they were driven from Yen-an, their famous capital in Shensi since 1934, subject of so many glowing descriptions by their foreign admirers. So far as can be seen the Communists have no other base in North China which can compare with Yen-an and Kalgan, and the Government is not likely to allow them time and opportunity to build another. Yet they continue to put up a hard resistance with their unexcelled guerrillas, and the Government's efforts to clear the North China railways, which roughly form a capital "A"—the Peking-Hankow, Peking-Nanking and the Lung-Hai for the cross-bar—have, up to the time of writing, been making slow progress.

General, now called Mr. Marshall, since he became Secretary of State, gave up his long and valiant attempts at mediation in January and returned to

merica where he published a report on the quarrel which summed it up in the word—distrust between the controlling powers of Kuomintang and Communists so unconquerable that "they each took counsel only of their own ears" and any offer by the one side was merely regarded by the other as a trap designed for their ultimate destruction. On the Kuomintang side a group of reactionaries, strongly backed by military men who maintained that the only way to end Communism was to stamp it out by force, were deaf to all General Marshall's arguments; while "the dyed-in-the-wool Communists do not hesitate at the most drastic measures . . . to wreck the economy of China and produce a situation that would facilitate the over-throw or collapse of the Government, without any regard to the immediate suffering of the people."

The dire effects of the civil war are sufficiently revealed in trade figures and the terrible depreciation of the dollar. In a total trade with Great Britain of £882,946 in 1946 China's adverse balance was £4,863,736: with America it is still worse. According to Mr. O. K. Yui, the Finance Minister, military operations eat up eighty per cent. of the Government's revenue, not to mention the diversion of industries which must keep the soldiers supplied. With the disruption of railways and communications produce cannot move. But this unfortunately is not the whole story. The Yangtze Valley is untouched by the war. But the Chinese shipping companies have been able to put pressure on the Government to exclude British ships from the Great River (though there should be, as there was formerly, ample business for all) and while the Chinese have not enough ships for the work, they have pushed up rates to prohibitive heights. China is rich in coal, yet it is actually cheaper in Shanghai to buy American coal than Chinese.

It is curious that so little appears to be coming from China south of the Yangtze (nearly half the country) although there is no fighting there. Last year the Chinese achieved a really brilliant feat in getting the Canton-Hankow trunk railway, which they had torn up during the war to check the Japanese advance, re-opened throughout to traffic. There is moreover nothing to interfere with traffic, by junks and barges at least, on the West River and others which used to pour their rich produce through Canton. Yet exports from the south are still a trickle compared with pre-war days. It is to be feared that inordinate taxation, official "squeeze" and enormous smuggling, not the more primitive kind of bygone years, but conducted by well-organized and heavily armed gangs including officers of the army and navy, are the cause.

With no exports to support the currency, no metallic reserve, monstrous inflation was inevitable. There are at least four different currencies in China, one in the centre, another in the north where the Communists have their own currency, another in Manchuria, others in the south and I believe the west. No one knows from day to day in Shanghai what the dollar will purchase and whether the ricksha ride which cost \$5,000 yesterday will not cost \$6,000 to-day. Hotel charges are higher than in the best New York hotels and wages have

been forced to a pitch at which the Chinese workman can no longer compete with the European.

Regulations against the import of non-essential goods were tightened up in January and in February Dr. T. V. Soong, the Premier, proposed a number of subsidies for exports. This immediately gave rise to a general belief that further devaluation of the dollar was impending, which, coupled with rumours that persons in high places were using inside knowledge to enrich themselves, caused a panic in which on one day the dollar, officially quoted at 3,050 to the American dollar, dropped to 17,500. The Government certainly acted with commendable promptitude. Dealings in gold bars (a favourite form of gambling) and foreign currencies were forbidden as also the use of American dollars which had become the common medium for business transactions, payment of salaries, rents and so forth*; strikes and lock-outs were forbidden, salaries and prices in certain directions were fixed; private fortunes abroad were ordered to be brought home; a severe inquisition into the conduct of various banks was started; and the dollar was pegged at 12,000 to one American dollar—48,000 to the pound. The panic was for the time being stayed, a financial landslide averted, not least perhaps because it was plain that General Chiang Kai-shek had taken charge of the situation.

One outcome of the crisis was the enforced resignation of Dr. T. V. Soong, the Premier. Many foreign friends read of this with unfeigned regret and sympathy. But it must be confessed that among his countrymen Dr. Soong has never been popular. Financial genius and able organizer, he is shy, temperamental and abrupt. Latterly he has given repeated offence by refusing to appear before the Legislative Yuan (or Council) and report on his doings. Popular opinion held him responsible not only for the financial crisis but for not checking the alleged gambling in high places mentioned above; incongruously enough (for "T.V." has always been a Liberal) he was associated with the reactionaries of the Kuomintang whom the Communists are by no means alone in detesting. When he did appear before the Legislative Yuan there were shouts of "Get him out; Premier Soong must go." It is a sad end of a great career which has, in the past, been of much benefit for China. The Premiership was temporarily taken over by the Generalissimo.

So much for the dark side of the Chinese picture, gloomy indeed, yet on which judgment may be tempered by the memory that China had been more disrupted by what was in fact fourteen years of war (dating from Japan's seizure of Manchuria) than any country, her industries wrecked, her administration shattered. And not least is recovery hampered by her vastness, over which the Republic has never yet established uniform control among the wide

* In the past two years hundreds of millions of gold dollars have been brought into China and spent there by American troops. Private Chinese deposits in America alone are estimated to amount to \$300,000,000, and there are probably plenty of deposits elsewhere, in Switzerland for example.

ities of peoples and interests concerned. China may be compared to a scarred and weakened by wounds, continually thrown back by relapses, in whom healthy forces are at work to obliterate the scars and re-invigorate the system. Dr. T. V. Soong may or may not have been made a scapegoat for others. But his downfall revealed the new strength of public opinion which can be of the greatest value in developing a balanced democracy. There are other signs, too, of its working.

In November the National Assembly met at last after four postponements, under General Chiang Kai-shek's resolute decision that the adoption of the constitution must wait no longer. The Communists and the Democratic League, an association of middle parties, refused to participate. But at the moment the Social Democrats and Young China Party, most important factions of this League, came in and about 1,700 men and women out of a possible 2,020 assembled, party men, independents, intellectuals, business and professional men, representatives from overseas, Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Manchuria.

There were heated moments, of course; but, with the aid of a number of steering committees, the proceedings were thoroughly businesslike. With the usual Chinese common sense it was enacted that anyone who did not vote should be reckoned as assenting; no one could wreck a motion by abstaining from voting. But there was never any sign of a split, though more than once Generalissimo (who significantly had accepted nomination to the presidium as representative, not of the Kuomintang, but of Nanking City) used his influence to thwart insidious motions by the Kuomintang reactionaries. On Christmas Day the Constitution was triumphantly adopted. If fairly enacted, it is undoubtedly a good, liberal instrument ensuring the large degree of local self-government which China's huge size and immemorial practice make demand, with adequate control, by local election of provincial officials and through the elective Legislative Yuan (which will be a sort of Parliament representing the National Assembly between its meetings), over the government.

With the adoption of the Constitution the "period of political tutelage", during which the Kuomintang were politely supposed to be indoctrinating China in constitutional government, came automatically to an end. "Henceforth," said General Chiang Kai-shek to the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, "whatever comments the Party may have to make on affairs must be passed to the Government as observations, not as orders." Nevertheless it took four months of hard bargaining in Nanking before the Coalition Government, which will carry on and prepare for the inauguration of the Constitution next December, finally emerged.

This Coalition has obvious defects, first and foremost its cumbrousness. In contrast with the exquisite simplicity of the imperial system, in which the officials kept order (themselves being kept in order by the Emperor) and

collected taxes while the people governed themselves,* China's adaptation from foreign models have been extraordinarily complicated. At the top of the Coalition Government is the State Council which frames policy and instructs the Executive Yuan accordingly. This body (commonly called the Cabinet) submits its measures to the Legislative Yuan, which, if it disapproves, can have them referred back to the State Council. Finally there is the Controlling Yuan, carrying on the duties of criticism and impeachment of the Censors in Imperial days, also able to hold up measures of which it disapproves. With so many Councils to be satisfied, it does seem that action must at best be slow and heavy.

At first sight, too, the preponderance of Kuomintang still appears excessive with seventeen in the State Council against four each of the Social Democrats, Young China Party and Independents; and twenty out of twenty-seven in the Executive Committee. But these are all drawn from the Liberal wing of the Kuomintang which supported General Chiang in the Chungking concessions. The Executive Committee, as has been seen, is doubly checked; it is mostly composed of Ministers and Vice-Ministers, some of them experienced and well-trying Liberals. And it is specially noticeable that eleven places have been kept open in the State Council for Communists and Democratic League: if they come in, the Kuomintang will be in a minority of six.

In the main, the Coalition does appear to be a genuine move towards representative government on democratic lines. The appointment of General Chang Chun as Premier makes a good impression. A thick-set forceful man of fifty-eight, with strong features and kindly mien, a great reader of history, a Christian, he made a name for himself as Foreign Minister before the war and in recent years the huge western province of Szechuan has become under his governorship the model province of China. Other appointments could be mentioned which give ground for confidence.

One thing is clear. The formation of the Coalition, the prominence given in its inaugural programme to a promise to seek peace "by political means" (in other words, not by fighting) with the Communists, and the places left open for Communists in the State Council put the responsibility squarely upon them. If fighting goes on, it will be because they will it. With men like Mao Tse-tung, the Red dictator, and his immediate followers there is no arguing. But there are others even among the leaders of a different cast; and General Marshall has expressed his conviction that great numbers of young Chinese have only been attracted to Communism by revulsion from the bad administration of the Kuomintang and could be won back by genuine reforms. How far Russia is helping the Communists it is impossible to say. There is no doubt whatever that she facilitated their entry into Manchuria, where they are now

* Under the great Han, Ming and Manchu Emperors this was the best government in the world. During our thirty-two years' tenancy of Weihaiwei we adopted it almost unaltered and worked to perfection.

strongly established at Harbin in the north, with Russia conveniently near and them, that the Chinese Government apparently thinks best for the present to let them alone; and Mr. Molotov's eagerness to have China's internal affairs discussed at the recent Moscow Conference excited many suspicions. China's foreign affairs are essentially dependent on internal conditions. If reform is really enforced, Communism will dwindle and wither away for want of the food it feeds on; and it is certainly doubtful whether Russia would continue to back it against the masses of the people.

The Coalition will be closely watched in the coming months. There is no instant sovereign remedy, miracles are not to be expected, the whole administration needs purging from top to bottom, and there is a woeful shortage of experienced men. China, too, is suffering from exaggerated self-assertiveness which is up in arms against foreign help. There are, for instance, hundreds of ex-employees of the Shanghai Municipal Council who could unobtrusively help to clear the Settlement from its present deplorable muddle and mess. But native pride forbids their employment.

Yet China has great assets. In General Chiang Kai-shek leadership has already shaped itself to the needs of the time: the harsh soldier of twenty years ago has broadened into the far-sighted statesman, whose aims are as much beyond dispute as the greatness of his prestige. In his support a new enlightened public opinion has come into existence against which neither Communism nor Kuomintangism can prevail for ever. China has still a hard, long path and many discouragements to face. But there is light at the end of it.

THE FUTURE OF CYPRUS

BY W. L. BURN

IN February, the National Delegation of Cyprus presented to the Colonial Secretary a claim for the "organic union" of the island with Greece. Mr. Creech Jones was by no means unsympathetic but it is evident that the claim has not so far convinced the Cabinet. A new Governor has been appointed in the person of Lord Winster, to be met with a boycott of Greek Cypriot elements in Nicosia; as a consequence of which the Greek-Cypriot members of the Advisory Council have been dismissed. Meanwhile, the Dodecanese Islands have been formally transferred to Greece; and in the background is the momentous re-orientation of policy following upon President Truman's decision to afford help and countenance to Greece and Turkey. In these circumstances the future of Cyprus raises problems of very great delicacy and complexity, which cannot be adequately expressed in terms of national self-determination *versus* British imperial interests.

It has been the fate of Cyprus to be the objective of powers engaged on offensive or defensive enterprises in the eastern Mediterranean. Engulfed by the Crusades, it became for three centuries the fief of the Lusignans, when brilliant and oppressive Latin feudalism was established, with the native inhabitants, mostly the descendants of Greeks who had migrated from Asia Minor, as its base. The Venetians seized the island in 1489 as a base against Turkish advance and held it until the successful attack by Selim II in 1570. Thereafter, until 1878, Cyprus remained under Turkish rule, burdensome in the taxes it demanded, but otherwise apathetic and (save for the terrorism of 1821) relatively mild.

British interest in Cyprus had been negligible until 1878 when, by the Cyprus Convention, Britain secured a protectorate over it in return for her engagement to defend Asiatic Turkey against Russia. It is necessary to the understanding of British policy in Cyprus to appreciate the reasons for the establishment of the protectorate. Cyprus was selected because it was: (1) a "place of arms" from which British forces could assist in the defence of Asia Minor; (2) so situated as to be useful for protecting the Suez Canal and the route to India; (3) a "territory sufficiently large, possessed of sufficient natural resources and inhabited by such races of people as should allow the experiment of what good government will do being fairly tried." Unfortunately, the Turks showed no interest in the "experiment in good government" so obligingly offered at their door; competent authorities had always doubted whether Cyprus would

There has been any use for the defence of Asia Minor; and when Britain acquired control of Egypt the island appeared strategically as well as politically superfluous. The twenty years of British rule which followed the initial outburst of activity and enthusiasm were thus set against a background of disillusionment and it was in this period that Cyprus became the "neglected island" which it was unfairly represented to be long after the neglect has ceased.

It ceased when Joseph Chamberlain came to the Colonial Office and initiated a period of public works and public guidance designed to improve the communications and water supplies of the island, to renew the forests and to promote agriculture. Technical mistakes were made (the Messaorian storage reservoirs were unsuccessful) and far too little was done in the sphere of public health. Nevertheless, the material development of the island was substantially improved.

Politically the situation was far less satisfactory. There was little understanding of the fact that the problem of government in Cyprus was not the same as that which existed where the governed were simple and primitive peoples. The British authorities usually liked the Cypriot peasant but they took no pains to cultivate the Orthodox priesthood or the literate classes generally. Nor did they make provision for higher education. As a result, the best schools and monasteries became seminaries of disloyalty and the younger Greek-Cypriots came back from the University of Athens to spread that disloyalty still further. The Legislative Council established in 1882 with six nominated and twelve elected members (nine Greek and three Moslem) was ineffective only in its factiousness and during the Balkan Wars a demand for union with Greece grew up in the towns. This demand was strengthened by the British offer of Cyprus to Greece in 1915 in return for Greek assistance to the Allies; an offer never accepted but never forgotten. After the Armistice of 1918 a delegation of Greek-Cypriots came to England to present their case for union but although they received some support from the British press they were unsuccessful. The Admiralty is supposed to have advised retention of the island; M. Venezelos made no formal request for its transfer; the Greek Empire in Asia Minor ruined the hopes of Pan-Hellenists; and it was obvious that Italy had no intention of evacuating the Dodecanese.

Nevertheless the agitation in Cyprus for union with Greece ("*Enosis*") or, failing that, for a larger measure of self-government, flourished. Disloyalty was sedulously indoctrinated among the Greek-Cypriots and publicly flaunted. In 1931, with the additional incitements of the general economic depression and a disastrous drought, and in the face of the supine detachment of the Colonial Office, seditious speeches were followed by the burning of Government House at Nicosia in October. Ugly riots ensued in other towns but order was restored by the end of the month. The leaders of the disturbances were deported; the Legislative Council was abolished; a press censorship was established and the flying of Greek flags and other seditious acts were prohibited.

On the positive side the teaching of English was made compulsory in the elementary schools and a teachers' training college was founded; the police organization was reformed; investigations were made into the island's most acute problem, that of rural indebtedness; and there was a marked revival of British interest in the history and life of the island.

In 1933 a nominated Advisory Council was established but with this exception and minor modifications the constitutional position remained unaltered. The war, however, introduced further complications, material and otherwise. Although no attack was made on Cyprus such an attack was expected after the fall of Crete and a considerable number of troops were stationed, at one time or another, in the island. The civil airfield at Nicosia was made into a properly-equipped military airfield and six other landing-grounds were constructed for military use. The non-material effects of the war are less simple to explain. Cypriots were encouraged to enlist for service abroad, partly by the use of propaganda (now seen to be debatable) in favour of "Greece and Liberty". In 1943 the Government allowed the Progressive Party of the Working People (A.K.E.L.) to function as a legal political party. The A.K.E.L. was vociferously in favour of union with Greece and at the time of the E.A.M. revolt in December 1944 a number of Greek-Cypriots in sympathy with it issued a manifesto denouncing British imperialism. At the same time the Communist movement was noted as gathering strength and in January 1945 eighteen leaders of trade-unions were charged with issuing seditious and inflammatory matter. The so-called Pan-Cyprian Trade Union Committee had by this time come under Communist domination and the accused were charged with encouraging the overthrow of the constitution by violence. In October 1946, however, they were released and in the same month the Colonial Secretary announced that a consultative assembly would be summoned to consider proposals for a constitutional reform, with a view to the re-establishment of a central legislature.

These proposals met with little response. It was not merely the extreme Left Wing elements among the Greek-Cypriots who clamoured for union with Greece. Encouraged no doubt by the restoration of the Greek monarchy, numbers of the Greek-Cypriot *bourgeoisie* have supported the demand; and two other factors, which did not exist after the 1914-18 war, have to be taken into consideration. The Italians have at last been dislodged from the Dodecanese and consequently British rule over a population mainly Greek in origin and language (though never of Greek nationality) may appear more anomalous than it did in 1918. Moreover, the Greek Government has for the first time formally associated itself with the movement for union, though in terms courteous to Britain; the Prime Minister declaring in March of this year that the settlement sought, if it materialized, would win the eternal gratitude of the Hellenic nation.

So the case stands for examination. The most obvious, though far from

only, consideration is the clash between the "nationalist" and the imperial conceptions. An empire, by its very nature, must include peoples of different languages, races and traditions. If the *raison d'être* were simply identity in these matters no empire, including that of the U.S.S.R., could continue to exist. It has also to be observed that the "nationalism" of the Greek-Cypriots is not the same thing as that of French Alsatians after 1871. Cyprus had no organic connection with Byzantium after the eleventh century and it has had no organic connection with the modern Greek nation at all. It is not an Alsace-Lorraine, forcibly severed from its mother-country in full political consciousness. Its "nationalist" aspirations are certainly not among the strongest of their kind. Even if they were stronger than they are the mere fact of satisfying them does not justify their application to the British Empire and to no other; still less their application to Cyprus and not, let us say, to Gibraltar. The next consideration is the probable effect of union with Greece on the welfare of the Cypriots as a whole. It is necessary to say "as a whole" because two classes, the Moslem-Cypriots and the peasants, whether Greek or Moslem, are often apt to escape notice. The National Delegation described the Moslems as a "small minority", although in 1931 when the total population of the island was 347,959 they numbered 64,238, or nearly a fifth. The Delegation described their intentions towards the Moslems as "the best" and spoke of their "wish" that minorities should participate equally "in all the rights and privileges of full citizenship in a free State." But, before that, there occurred a significant and possibly sinister passage. "It would be neither reasonable nor proper that their views should become an obstacle to the rights of liberty of the overwhelming majority nor a hindrance to the political progress of the island." Putting all these statements together it appears that the Moslems and the other small minorities are to enjoy "full citizenship in a free State" subject to the restrictions inherent in the conceptions of liberty and political progress held by the majority. This, of course, is a common attitude of majorities. They say, we are going to achieve wonders and we must not be hindered by backward elements. Greeks and Moslems live on tolerably good terms in Cyprus at present but the position of the Moslems sharing a common allegiance with the Greeks to an authority which has to hold the balance between them would not be the same thing as the position of the Moslems as a minority in Cyprus and a tiny minority in the Greek State as a whole. We do not want to leave, or create, another Palestine in Cyprus; with the possibility that the Moslems might appeal to their colleagues, if not in Turkey, then in the Arab States. The policy of not worrying about a minority, of trusting that racial relationships will somehow settle themselves, is a dangerous one.

Then there is the peasant, in an island where the industrial workers number only about 20,000. It is to be emphasized that no plan for Cyprus, whether made in London, Nicosia or Athens, is of any use unless it assists the peasant

and, in particular, deals with the gnawing problem of rural indebtedness. Mr B. J. Surridge, in his *Survey of Rural Life in Cyprus* (1930), noted that only eighteen per cent. of the peasant proprietors were not in debt and that the co-operative societies had not only failed to develop co-operation but had also failed to provide an alternative supply of credit. The result was that the peasant was the slave of the money-lender, obliged to buy seeds and stock from him at the highest price and to sell produce to him at the lowest. This is a problem which can only be dealt with, and that slowly, by an authority of the highest impartiality and integrity: it is not, to speak frankly, a problem which can safely be left to the Greek-Cypriot urban politician. We have by no means been able to eliminate corruption from the administration but very few people acquainted with the island will believe that a more competent and completely incorruptible government could be formed from the politicians of Nicosia. A further consideration regarding the claim of the National Delegation to speak for "the people of Cyprus" is the possibility that the younger generation of Cypriots, who learnt English at school and many of whom served in the British Army, is by no means committed to the demand for union with Greece.

It is the argument of this article that the mere existence of "nationalist" aspirations in Cyprus is no reason for its transfer from Britain to Greece and that there is no evidence (rather the contrary) that such a transfer would assure the welfare of the inhabitants. But, of course, this is not the end of the matter. We are bound to consider the effect of a transfer not merely on Anglo-Greek relations but on the whole political situation in the east of the Mediterranean. The National Delegation did, indeed, suggest a special compromise in the form of a British base in a Greek Cyprus. In present conditions a base cannot be confined to a small area. As the Americans have found in Panama, as we ourselves decided in respect of Eire, it needs a good deal of space outside the actual fortified area, for radar stations, gun-sites, landing grounds. An island the size of Cyprus has to be defended as a whole and it is difficult to see how it can be defended as a whole if it is not governed as a whole, if we had to negotiate with a government in Athens for every necessary extension of our defences. Moreover, although the present Greek Government is friendly to us, we cannot assume that this will be true of a future Greek Government. Suppose that as the result of a Communist revolution Communist authority came into being in Cyprus. What would be the effect on our defensive position there?

Dismissing, as we must, the suggestion of such a base as specious, we return to the larger considerations. If it could be shown that Anglo-Greek co-operation and all that goes with it depended to a substantial degree on the cession of Cyprus to Greece, there might well be a case for that cession in spite of the objections we have considered. Nor would we then be justified in holding Cyprus to provide camps for illicit Jewish immigrants to Palestine. At

moment there is not sufficient evidence that Anglo-Greek accord depends upon the cession of Cyprus. The attitude of the Greek Government is no proof : the Greek Government in present circumstances could do or claim anything less. The cession of Cyprus would not strengthen a Greek Government to any marked extent; nor would refusal to cede damage Anglo-Greek (or Anglo-American) relations unless an ambiguous and indecisive policy on our part encouraged a Greek Government to stake its existence on the acquisition of Cyprus. If a Greek Cyprus were the missing piece in the Mediterranean jigsaw puzzle, then there would be a strong and perhaps an overwhelming case for discarding the obvious objections to it. It is not so at the moment and is not likely to be so at any period of the time which one can foresee. Until it is so the case for the British retention of the island remains the better, with this proviso : that to discourage ill-founded Greek hopes and possibly American suspicions it should be stated carefully and convincingly at once.

RUSSIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

BY WALTER J. KOLARZ

MOSLEMS of the Middle East, fearing the 'Russian Colossus', may be tempted to find an up-to-date interpretation of a Koran prophecy that Gog and Magog will one day pass the Caucasus mountains, slay the Faithful and destroy the "blessed realm of the believers." There is and will be a Russian attempt to advance into the Middle East, not the barbarian, bloodstained spectacular invasion of Gog and Magog but one assisted by such subtle and powerful weapons as are in keeping with the spirit of Soviet Russia. The first three of these weapons—the imperialist tradition of Czarist Russia, the exploitation of local nationalism to the detriment of Russia's neighbours and the propaganda value of the economic progress of the Soviet Republics bordering on the Middle East—are generally known and appreciated. The fourth weapon, the Russian gift of absorbing foreign culture and national traditions and using them for the greatness of Russia, is not always clearly perceived.

The ideological arsenal which Russia can use for action in the Middle East is vast but her real aims in that part of the world are limited and always were. They are confined to the belt of States immediately bordering the Soviet Union—Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan.

Russian world politics, so far, has never ventured into areas where the ground was unknown and where Russia would meet problems for which she was ill-prepared. The characteristic feature of the Soviet Union is that both internal and foreign policies are carried out most thoroughly and systematically, with the "entire soul" as the Russians used to say. This systematic character is entirely lacking in Russia's tackling of the Arab problem but appears in classical form in her Persian policy, a study of which seems essential for an appreciation of Soviet methods in foreign policy and the intermixture of home and foreign policies.

Although there is consistency in Russian foreign policy throughout the centuries, conditioned by unvarying strategic and economic interests, Soviet Russia's claims and aims are different in quality and quantity from those of Czarist Russia. The Empire of the Czars demanded territories, zones of influence and privileges. The Russia of Marshal Stalin demands all these on a larger scale and in addition the souls of the peoples concerned.

The Russians of the Soviet epoch are firmly convinced that the aims of the Government, pursued not only in the Middle East but also in the Far East are

stern Europe, have nothing in common with imperialism. Not only the Soviet man in the street " but to a greater extent even the intellectual élite of the Soviet State consider the actions of their own Government in the field of international politics to be rightful and legitimate while they are filled with genuine indignation at the "breaches of international law" allegedly committed by hers. The Soviet Russian intellectual is deeply convinced of the existence of close, intimate links between the Russian people and practically all peoples over whom the Soviet Union has established or wants to establish some sort of overlordship. He takes for granted that such links are lacking between Anglo-Americans and other peoples.

One may say that the Soviet public is thrust into this apparently illogical attitude by the pressure of an all-mighty propaganda and an exaggerated patriotism but in reality there is much more in what, to most Western people, seems a lack of logic". Here lies, in fact, one of the great misunderstandings between East and West. The world outside Russia has overlooked the intellectual wealth absorbed by the Russian mind in the last twenty years. The Soviet State through the medium of the Soviet Russian intelligentsia has appropriated to itself the national traditions of a number of peoples living just at the fringe and partly within the Soviet Union and has made these traditions part and parcel of Soviet political and cultural propaganda.

Persia is perhaps the most striking case in point. Besides trying to introduce Communist or near-Communist movements into Persia, Russia, particularly during and after the second world war, has made an attempt to promote the cultural ties between the Persians and the Soviet Union and at the same time to protect the "national minorities" within Persia. The pursuit of such conflicting aims has suffered setbacks which, however, will not deter Soviet Policy from resuming the conquest from within at a more favourable moment.

The emergence of an autonomist movement in Persian Azerbaijan, closely co-operating with the Soviet authorities, was co-ordinated with an ideological campaign stressing the affinities between the Russians and the Azerbaijanis. These affinities are by no means a pure invention of complaisant Soviet scholars supplying a scientific background to the political struggle, which they indeed do. The affinities exist in reality. They constitute but a small section of the great history of cultural inter-dependence between the Russians and the Asiatic peoples. This Russian historic patrimony was largely neglected under the Czarist régime but under Soviet rule has become an immense source of arguments used not only to strengthen the régime within the U.S.S.R. but also to support any active or, as it sometimes seems to Western observers, aggressive foreign policy anywhere on the enormous Asiatic front of world politics extending from the Caucasus along the present Soviet borders to the Pacific Ocean.

The Academy of Science of the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic recently undertook the task of demonstrating that the union between Azerbaijan and Russia is based not only on the superior Russian weapons which conquered the present

Azerbaijan capital, Baku, in 1806 but also on the attraction exercised by Russian culture on the Azerbaijanis. The compilation of the Academy takes great pains to show that long ago "Azerbaijani thinkers and public figures favoured the strengthening of Azerbaijan's links with Russia." Several instances are given of personal relations between progressive Russian personalities and representatives of Azerbaijani intellectual life and of the influence which the former exerted on the latter.

Soviet scholars usually speak of Azerbaijan without specifying whether they are referring to the Russian or the Persian Azerbaijan, thus giving to understand that the great personalities of the Azerbaijani Turks are the common property of both parts of Azerbaijan. This approach has helped to obliterate from the consciousness of the Soviet intelligentsia the existence of the frontier line between the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan and the Persian Province of the same name. Other facts too have contributed to the obliteration, in particular the many thousands of Persian Azerbaijanis attracted to the oil-centre, Baku, since the end of the nineteenth century. In Baku they came into contact first with revolutionary Russian and later with Soviet ideology and were thus predestined to become the backbone of a left-wing and ultimately pro-Russian movement in Persia.

Baku has become the Mecca of Azerbaijani revolutionary intellectuals and autonomists. Azerbaijani poets praise Baku with oriental exaltation. One of them, Tavrieli, has described Baku as "rose of beauty graven in stone" and another, Muhammed Biri, poet and also secretary of the Iranian Azerbaijani trade unions, says he came to Baku to drink the "life-giving water" of this city and that he wept "happy tears" on seeing Baku. These poems of the poets of 'Southern Azerbaijan' were published in Russian shortly before the breakdown of the Azerbaijani movement and undoubtedly strengthened the messianic spirit of the Russian intellectuals who read them.

From the point of view of Russian power politics in relation to Persia, Soviet Azerbaijan is not only a link with Persian Azerbaijan but also with the whole of Persia. Soviet Azerbaijan, once a part of Persia, has also purely Iranian cultural traditions which for the Soviet State have a more than platonic scientific interest since they serve a long-range Russian imperial policy. Thus the great Persian poet of the twelfth century, Nizami of Gandja, became a "poet of the Soviet Union" by the very fact that he lived and died on the territory of the present Azerbaijan Soviet Republic. Moreover, Nizami is being interpreted in a way which fits into the general Soviet ideology. The leading Soviet journal *Bolshevik* recently stressed that the "great merit" of Nizami consists in having undermined the basis of Islam by opposing the theological teaching of the unchangeable character of the world.

In a similar way Russia annexed the greatest Persian poet, Firdausi, by associating him with the Tadjiks, the small people of Iranian descent of which a part lives within the Soviet Union. The cult of Firdausi in Soviet Russia has a dual

pose. It serves to flatter the Iranian intellectuals and to make the Soviet Union more attractive. On the other hand, Firdausi's works are used in a purely local sphere as an instrument for the education of the Tadjiks in loyalty to the socialist fatherland. A passage taken from Firdausi's greatest work *Shahname* was included in a "Letter from the Tadjik people to the Tadjik leaders on the front" and a book issued under the auspices of the Tadjik branch of the Soviet Academy said that the image of Rustem, the hero of *Shahname*, a legendary defender of Iran against Turan, inspired the Tadjiks "in the fight against the German fascist barbarians."

Not only Firdausi but almost the entire history of Iran, certainly the entire Iranian past of Central Asia, has been brought into connection with the Tadjiks to-day and as the Tadjiks of Afghanistan and India are silent while the Soviet Tadjiks, under Moscow's guidance, are most vociferous all the credit goes to the latter. The existence of an Iranian Republic within the Soviet Union, conscious of being the people of the Avesta, the religious book of the old Iranians, and of many heroes of ancient Iranian history has great importance not only for the ideological conquest of Persia but even more so for that of Afghanistan. The symbol of Tadjik-Persian identity between the two world wars was the poet, Abulkasin Lahuti, proclaimed throughout the Soviet Union as the national poet of Tadjikistan. Lahuti was born in Persia and after participating in the Persian revolutionary movement following the first world war he fled to the Soviet Union. In many poems translated into several languages this Persian holder of the Order of Lenin dreams of the time when the "land of Shiraz will drink the blood of the oppressors," when his "old Iran" will be a "free Soviet country" and when a brother of the Dnieproges, the big electro-hydraulic station in the Ukraine, will stand on the banks of the Karun river.

No great variety of arguments and efforts might be needed to inspire respect for the Soviet Union among the people of Afghanistan which, unlike Persia, has a common frontier with Tadjikistan. Occasional references to the division of the Tadjik people into three groups living in Afghanistan, India and Soviet Tadjikistan and to the historical union of the present Soviet Tadjikistan with a large part of Afghanistan have, indeed, already been made. A far more important factor, however, which may determine the future relationship between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union is the establishment of an economically flourishing area at the northern border of Afghanistan. This area includes a new town, Dushanbe, the capital of Tadjikistan with already 100,000 inhabitants, a Lahuti theatre and a Firdausi State Library. Under the new Five Year Plan Stalinism may easily outgrow the Afghan capital, Kabul, just as it has already outgrown Herat, the once populous centre of Iranian-Tadjik culture.

Russia's big and growing frontier cities have a logic of their own; they make territorial expansion sooner or later particularly when the neighbour in question is a disorganized State. A nearby frontier has often been unbearable to a Russian city. This is why Leningrad 'swallowed' the Karelian Isthmus,

why Odessa obtained breathing-space through the annexation of Bessarabia and why Baku is exerting constant pressure on the Iranian South. Stalinabad may turn out to be another case in point. The attraction of a modern city with big white buildings and trolleybus lines making its appearance in the once more neglected part of Central Asia is calculated to be irresistible to its neighbours and may indeed prove so to be.

Should the Soviet Union one day be able to extend her borders from Tadjikistan and Uzbekistan to the south, into Afghanistan—and the chances of such an extension may be favourable after the establishment of an independent Indian Republic—the Soviet people, particularly the Soviet intellectual, would not look on this extension as the addition of an alien district, the conquest of something strange and new, but rather as a re-union.

These Soviet intellectuals may have just read a book by an Uzbek author, Aibek, published in 1946 in Leningrad in a Russian translation of 35,000 copies in which it is brought home to them that Herat, the most important town in Western Afghanistan, is not only closely linked with Tadjikistan but also with another Soviet Republic—Uzbekistan. The book is a biography of Mir Alishir Nawai in whose person Soviet cultural propaganda skilfully links up Tadjik, Iranian culture and literature with the cultural efforts of the Uzbek people. Nawai, the "founder of the Uzbek literary language" is held in high esteem by the Afghans too but they lag far behind the Soviet Union in glorifying this great poet. There is already a Soviet stamp bearing his effigy and his name has been given to the new Uzbek National Theatre in Tashkent, a particularly large and splendid building. Thus Afghanistan, to all intents and purposes, has lost Nawai and may one day lose Herat which in the Soviet mind has become so closely connected with Uzbeks and Tadjiks. Aibek's book, *Nawai*, indeed begins with the words "Herat the town of poets became more and more beautiful and colourful . . ." The great stress laid on historical and cultural affinities, however, cannot obscure the fact that there is oil in Northwestern Afghanistan, at least according to repeated statements of Soviet scientists. The potentially oil-bearing districts of Afghanistan seem to be adjacent to the state of Northern Persia where Russia hopes to obtain oil concessions.

While only the Russia of the Soviet period has succeeded in using the Azerbaijanis, Tadjiks and Uzbeks for purposes of imperial policy in the Middle East there is a long tradition of Russian—Armenian association and of exploitation of the Armenian issue to the embarrassment of Russia's neighbours. The Armenians are one of the most unfortunate peoples of the world and their poet Ovanes Tumanyan, rightly said that Armenia's sorrow was a shoreless sea. Russia made a most favourable bargain by her association with a people whose history has been one of almost uninterrupted suffering. Russia offered the Armenians shelter and protection, a problematic protection in times which compromised and jeopardized them beyond all real advantages implied by protection. In return Russia obtained from the Armenians a large number

people who worked in various ways for the glory of the Russian rulers, for the material prosperity of Russia. The Armenians were, indirectly, even responsible for the extension of Russia's borders and were in many cases what modern terminology would describe as a Russian fifth column in enemy or potentially enemy countries. It does not belittle in any way the tragic historic destiny of the Armenian people to say that the ghastly Armenian massacres in Turkey were directly connected with the rôle which Russian policy allotted to these people.

Soviet Russian policy towards the Armenians is not copied in every detail from this pattern of Czarist Russian policy but basically it is guided by the same spirit. Soviet Russia took from the Armenians, essentially a people of shopkeepers and merchants, their economic wealth and gave them the semblance of a State which was first subordinated to a Trans-Caucasian Soviet Federation and after 1936 was made a direct member State of the U.S.S.R. The Armenian Soviet Republic became the smallest of the new "States" of Trans-Caucasia, much too small for the liking of Armenian nationalists who considered that the "real Armenia" within the U.S.S.R. was more than twice as large as their Republic. Considerable Armenian minorities were left in Azerbaijan and Georgia while Armenia became one of the ethnically most homogeneous Republics of the entire Soviet Union. The Armenians believed, not without reason, that Moscow's favours went to Georgians and Azerbaijani Turks, their neighbours, and that they themselves were regarded as "a negligible quantity". Armenian nationalists specially resented the "loss" of Tiflis and Baku, the two largest cities of Trans-Caucasia whose development, in their view, was largely due to the spirit of enterprise of the Armenian *bourgeoisie*.

Despite all these setbacks to Armenian national ambitions the mere fact of the existence of an Armenian Republic turned out to be a considerable asset to Russian policy. It became an agency of propaganda and organization by which certain sections of the Armenian diaspora scattered over the world could be attracted. Whatever hardships Armenians may have endured in the transition to a collectivized economy these cannot be compared with their sufferings in Turkish Armenia which have made history.

Individual Armenians, tired of living abroad, returned to their homeland but this re-immigration never assumed the character of a mass movement before the 1939-1945 war. Only after the war, in connection with a marked deterioration in Russian-Turkish relations, was greater consideration given again to the Armenian question and a new systematic Russian "Armenian policy" took shape. It was expressed in two decrees, one of December 1945 providing special facilities including State subsidies, freedom from customs duties and taxes, for all Armenians wishing "to return to their homeland" and one of July 1946 granting Soviet citizenship automatically to any repatriated Armenian on crossing the Soviet border. Many Armenians may look on this repatriation with scepticism, may prefer to live in foreign countries, but others have returned

or will return and others, though not returning, will manifest their gratitude to the Soviet Union, thus increasing the number of pro-Russian sympathizers in the capitalist world, who are particularly valuable in the Middle East itself. In Lebanon Armenians are the main supporters of the local Communist Party and in Persian Azerbaijan many Armenians had leading posts in the pro-Soviet autonomy movement.

The Armenian Church also has its place in the Armenian policy of the Soviet Union. The 'Catholicos of all Armenians', just as in Czarist times, supports Russian State interests and has not only assisted the official repatriation campaign but has also pleased the Kremlin by condemning the general conduct of the Vatican as "incompatible with the high aims of Christianity."

Under the Soviet régime Armenia has been transformed from a predominantly agrarian country into a highly industrialized one, deriving four-fifths of its income from industrial production as against one-fourth in Czarist times. The capital, Erevan, has grown from a small town into a respectable city of 200,000 inhabitants. Thus Armenia clearly needs an increase of human material which if need be could be brought from Inner Russia but for the wider political aims of the Soviet Union it is preferable that the additional manpower should be supplied by Armenians returning from abroad. Every additional Armenian settling down in Soviet Armenia, working in the textile industry of Leninakan, in the chemical works of Kirovakan, in the machine-tool factories or scientific institutions of Erevan, not only contributes to the success of the Five Year Plan but also increases the pressure of an overpopulated Soviet Armenia on the comparatively empty Turkish spaces across the frontier.

The danger threatening Turkey does not lie in Armenian slogans about the "return of the Armenian lands of Kars and Ardahan" but predominantly in the fact that Soviet Trans-Caucasia is developing at a tremendous pace while Eastern Anatolia is in a state of relative stagnation. The existence of Erevan but also of Batum and Tiflis in Soviet Georgia is a challenge to north-eastern Turkey similar to the challenge of Baku to north-western Persia and of Jalalabad to Afghanistan. In all three cases the industrial potential, the technical progress and the accumulation of human material on the Soviet side of the border are the principal assets of Soviet policy in the Middle East and Central Asia. The ethnic and historic claims are there, in some parts they are strongly stressed but they would be ineffective had they not the economic and demographic arguments on their side.

National claims by "peoples of the Soviet Union" assume dynamic and aggressive character only when encouraged by the central authorities, that is only when required in the interests of the Soviet Empire. Should they be in contradiction to these interests they would be suppressed or pushed into the background. Thus Armenian aspirations were ignored when Russia sacrificed Kars and Ardahan to a policy of friendship with Turkey in 1921 and were promoted a quarter of a century later as part of a general policy aiming at the isolation

Turkey and her "peaceful encirclement". The Georgian claims against Turkey, partly conflicting with Armenian claims but far exceeding them in scope are less crystallized as yet but they are there. Should Russia decide to conduct an anti-Turkish offensive on a more impressive scale these claims will be brought forward since they serve Russia's desire to be not only the predominant but practically the sole Black Sea Power. The claims aim to secure for Russia a major foothold on the southern shore of the Black Sea including the port of Trebizond.

Soviet methods and trends towards expansion in the Middle East and Central Asia are clearly discernible; there are possibilities of expansion in which the Soviet leaders show a particularly keen interest but there is no plan of short-term conquest, no desire to advance at any cost within a specified time as was characteristic of Hitlerite Germany. The rulers of Russia think in terms of historic periods, not of 'spring offensives'. They do not want Russia to conquer only but to digest, they do not mind taking one step backward in order to take two steps forward at a more favourable moment. The rulers of Russia rely less on the sword than on the stubbornness and patience of the Russian common man, on the pioneering spirit of a people colonizing a country of gigantic size. Even now with a period of sacrifices just overcome and another lying ahead they believe this spirit will not fail them.

CRIME AND ITS TREATMENT

BY SIR HENRY SLESSER

SOMETIME before the war the School of Law in Columbia and Chicago Universities asked Professors Michael and Adler to report upon the need for institutes of criminology and criminal justice in the United States. They proceeded to undertake a detailed survey of the state of knowledge and methods of research in the subject from every aspect and, in 1932, published the results of their work in an important book, *Crime, Law and Social Science*, which has had a profound effect upon the understanding of this difficult subject. In the result they warmly advocated the establishment of institutes to undertake research which would have a direct effect upon the devising of means whereby crime might be mitigated and criminals redeemed. Not until 1947, however, was Lord Templewood, a former Home Secretary, able to congratulate Cambridge University, England that they had at length inaugurated a specific Department of Criminology.

He pointed out in his inaugural lecture* that there was great need for the scientific study of penal questions, that the "history and lessons of crime have been too long neglected" and that even lawyers have seldom regarded criminology as a serious study and that governments have tended to act haphazardly and leave penal problems out of the general province of social reform. He went so far as to declare that such negligence is "particularly apparent in England".

Thus the present archaic distinction between felonies and misdemeanours has no relation to modern problems, nor can the division of punitive treatment into penal servitude and imprisonment in the technical sense be justified upon any system of criminal therapy; it is merely a relic understandable by jurists but in practice indefensible. Sir Samuel Hoare, as he then was, when at the Home Office, undertook a special study of penal questions; he personally visited many prisons and came to the conclusion that "juvenile delinquency was the fundamental problem of crime and its prevention." He now states in his address that over half the habitual offenders have first been convicted before they were sixteen years of age and nearly a fifth before they were twenty. It is the young offender who, lacking proper supervision, is in his opinion most likely to be re-convicted. To send such young law breakers to prison generally is a mistake. Nevertheless, says Lord Templewood, the number of young persons

* *Crime and Punishment* by Lord Templewood. Stevens. 2s. 6d.

t to prison has recently been increasing, from some 1,500 in 1938 to nearly 600 in 1944. At the same time the number in Borstal institutions is less than before the war. The fact emerges that there is lamentably little consistency in treatment given to offenders by magistrates, if not by judges. The new department of Criminal Science has published the following disquieting summary:

Whereas the average for England and Wales of probation sentences for 1938 was 51 per cent. and just under 6 per cent. fined, Liverpool put only 35 per cent. on probation, but fined 21 per cent., and Gateshead put 34 per cent. on probation and fined 38 per cent. Other districts vary rather in the proportion of cases they dismissed after the charge was proved. The percentage under this heading for England and Wales was 24 per cent., but Swansea put 26 per cent. on probation and dismissed 42 per cent., whilst Bootle dismissed as many as 56 per cent. of the cases and put only 21 per cent. on probation. In Windsor the percentage placed on probation remains always under 10 per cent. Sometimes a comparison of the figures for two consecutive years will show a complete revolution in the policy adopted by a particular town. Thus in 1937, Oldham put only 21 per cent. on probation and fined 36 per cent.; in the following year the percentage on probation went up to 61 per cent., and no use at all was made of fines, and this policy was continued in 1938.

These and similar comparable figures throughout the country show how much the imposition of imprisonment, fine or probation still depends upon the idiosyncrasies of a particular bench. Moreover while some magistrates regard probation "as little more than dismissal or acquittal", to quote Lord Templeton, others take care to follow up the cases and even provide for after care. In the bill of 1938, not yet, alas, law, the minimum age for imprisonment by the Court of Summary Jurisdiction was to be raised to sixteen, "no offenders between seventeen and twenty-one, unless their characters were so unruly and depraved that they could not be safely detained in a Remand Home, and no offenders between seventeen and twenty-one unless and until the Court had obtained and considered information as to the circumstances and character of the defendant and was of opinion that no other method of dealing with him was appropriate."

Much confusion in the discussion of treatment for criminal persons has arisen from the fact that a crime in law need not necessarily be contrary to the generally prevailing moral code. Criminal liability is far more definite in scope than is demanded by any ethical standard, and the increasing tendency for new crimes to be created by the legislature or by ministerial powers under statute, having for their sanction not so much a public feeling of reprobation as the specific requirements of policy of a temporary kind, produces often a divorce between public opinion and existing penal provision—this is particularly true of offences of a semi-political or economic character—laws curtailing the right of self expression or commercial action deemed undesirable by the State.

Thus, apart altogether from the growth of humanistic sentiment, the old notions of retribution or deterrence (though Seneca favoured reformatory punishment) have largely lost their justification; no closer definition of a criminal

can be found than that he is a person who has behaved in some way prohibited by the criminal law—and this may or may not involve public disapprobation.

We cannot divorce the problem of proper remedial methods of dealing with criminals from the question: what order of acts should be made criminal offences? For in the end the control of crime is sought to be achieved by one of two methods—that of retributive justice, the older conception, which in one way or another involves discomfort to criminals as a retaliation for their crime; and the more recent curative system, which latter is peculiarly the subject which Lord Templewood and many other reformers have set themselves to consider.

At present no sufficient acceptance has been given by progressive minds to the fact that in dealing with criminals, however clinical may be the treatment, some punishment is essential; it is the combination of these two requirements which demands far more study than it has yet received; it is fatally easy to err on one side or the other. Thus after addressing a number of delinquents at the Borstal institution, at the end of my discourse, the Governor asked whether a "gentleman" wished to ask a question. Such a courtesy in the circumstances appears to me to be misplaced and to err on the side of sentimentalism. On the other hand, the new conception of the nature of prison labour has done much to mitigate the old vicious idea that the object of imprisonment, as in the case of the treadmill, was to break the spirit of the prisoner; the desire now prevails that the convict should be enabled, under discipline, to recover his self respect. "Training", says Lord Templewood, "should be based upon hard, but not lifeless, work." In no case should young offenders be sent to general local prisons; the new experimental "open prisons" should be used for the young and for those who have proved themselves worthy of trust. The right to earn pocket money for good work done is to be encouraged. The work of the Howard league in this matter has done incalculable good.

There remains the need for moral and religious influence. Again to quote Lord Templewood:

We must expect many failures. We are dealing in the world of crime with offenders who have often lacked home life and any useful training, who are often abnormal mentally or physically unfit, who are untouched by religious influences and have little or no feeling of personal or social responsibility. Theirs is a problem with a very hard core. And, as long as there is original sin in human nature, we shall never completely break down this hard core. We can, however, reduce it. We can reduce it by sensitive and sensitive methods of penal treatment. Some of these methods I have suggested to-day. But all these methods put together will not reach the root of the core. The root is moral, and the reason why the root has grown in recent years is that, however we may explain it, many moral restraints have lost much of their power in the confused and restless world of to-day. To reach therefore, the basic core, there is need for the force and heat of moral fervour.

It would be unfair to suggest that in this connection much valuable work has not been done by prison chaplains, by visitors specially dedicated to this work of spiritual reclamation, and by probation officers, yet, at the same time it must be admitted that the bad old spirit of regarding the criminal as a person is

irrevocably lost has not been entirely eliminated. The work of moral restoration can be greatly stimulated when once the prisoner realizes that help is waiting to be given to him when he leaves the gaol, and the work of the prisoners' aid societies in this connection could well be supplemented by the State finding employment far more than is at present the case, though even now many governments have worked to encourage the rehabilitation of those under their care.

The psychological contribution is also of importance; crime may be produced by mental disorders, poverty, thwarted energy and, in particular, in the case of the young, by a broken or unsatisfactory home. All these causes require, and should receive different treatment. While terms such as 'imprisonment', 'probation' or 'binding over' are useful as indicating modes of treatment, they tend to conceal the complexities of individual treatment, whether institutional or domiciliary. These are matters necessarily beyond the duty of routine surveillance, but it is suggested personal discrimination could be carried far further than it is to-day, more particularly in the case of the inmates of prisons; outside probation work is by its very nature far more elastic. The imposition of the fine, which is the penalty most usually employed by justices has this defect, that its severity varies so much with the means of the defendant and, moreover, often affects the family of the delinquent more seriously than himself, yet no other means of dealing with minor offences seems open at present where probation is not appropriate.

What is most needed to-day is a recognition of criminology as a specific social science. We must know more of the nature of criminal activity and organization, of the character of individual criminals, of the environment from whence they come, of the ways in which they commit crime and, lastly, of the comparative methods by which different States, officially and unofficially, deal with their wrong-doers. We have much vague generalization on the subject, and recently, a type of literature has become popular which deals with the experience of particular and unusual convicts, but of exact knowledge, worthy of the name of science there is terrible lack; neither legislators, judges, justices nor the police have yet awakened to the real and growing menace to society involved in the multiplication of criminals—modern weapons and means of rapid aerial and other transport, added to the acceptance of violence and illegality in two great wars, have increased the seriousness of the social menace.

We should not be stating the whole gravity of the case if we ignored the admitted decline in religious and moral standards, the Church appeals only to those who will listen to her voice, and they, for the most part, suffer from temptations other than those generally recognized as criminal. Sexual morality is at a very low ebb, as the appalling divorce statistics show us, currency and tax evasions are almost endemic, and people hear, not always with aversion, of other societies where the whole of the Christian foundation of conduct is openly repudiated. In all these circumstances it is not surprising that delinquency, particularly among the young, is so frequent and intractable, but those responsi-

ble for our laws and their administration cannot escape their share of the responsibility.

We would wish to know, if possible, why potential criminals become actual ones. Here statistics, though useful, are not in themselves conclusive. Certain types of crime, those of violence for instance, seem to be declining. Pilfering and larceny are to-day the staple offences. The effect of the rarity and value of goods and the effects of unemployment must be considered; psychological and social influences have both to be assessed. The effects of war and military service cannot be ignored, and the whole modern environment, the films, the press, the extension of educational facilities, all these for good or ill cannot be ignored. Above all we need to study the mental condition of wrong doers. According to a reliable American report, in that country twenty-five to forty per cent. of recidivists are feeble-minded and the same proportion or a greater one, was found to exist among youthful first offenders; the same investigation states that in the United States over fifty per cent. of the criminal population were suffering from some abnormal nervous or mental condition; for example of 1,000 cases in Detroit only 204 were found mentally normal, in another State, out of 7,000, sixty-nine per cent. were what is called 'psychopathic'. If these tentative researches be only approximately true, it would appear that crime is largely a mental problem and should be treated accordingly. A sense of inferiority among certain children, it is said, is largely responsible for juvenile thieving; sexual crimes constitute a problem of their own.

A recent work by the sociologist, Dr. Mannheim, would regard unsocial acts now not regarded as criminal, as more deserving of punishment than many present individualistic offences. He criticizes our criminal code as being too atomic in character and supports a view which is more perhaps characteristic of the Russian system under which offences of a political nature are regarded as far more serious than the infliction of personal injury. If this view be generally accepted, and there are signs of its development even in Western Europe, wholly new problems of treatment may arise; the method of persuasion by argument and inducement, practised by the Church in medieval times, and more violent by the Nazi and Fascists in our own, ranging from mild argument to physical coercion is not impossible. Nor can curative brain surgery, in these days of the medical approach to crime be altogether ignored. Sterilization and eugenics may not be discounted as possible future safeguards against crime. All these possibilities are not mentioned with approval, but merely to emphasize the change which is necessarily coming over our attitude towards crime and its prevention, and to suggest the need for the encouragement of such institutes of research as Lord Templewood has commended.

NEW PROCEDURE IN PARLIAMENT

BY DEREK WALKER-SMITH, M.P.

THOSE who seek to understand our parliamentary procedure will find that its evolution has followed the winding trail of empiricism rather than the straight high-road of theory. Its evolution has been characterized by a typically British desire to find something which works, something which serves the purpose of the present. A part of the difficulty of understanding this empirical aspect is because the purpose of Parliament, which it is designed to serve, has changed over the years. In its early days Parliament was in effect divorced from the executive government of the country, which was in the hands of the King and his inner council of ministers. Indeed this is in some ways an under-statement, since it was actually for the most part in opposition to it. Its main function was to acquire and to retain control of taxation, and to use this control as a lever for compelling the redress of grievances before the grant of supply without which the King's Government could not be financed. In this stage of its development, Parliament, or more accurately the House of Commons, was essentially an assembly of private members mainly in opposition, but not necessarily organized opposition. It follows that the primary purpose of the infant parliamentary procedure of those days was the safeguarding of the rights of private members in debate. It is in consequence broadly true to this day that the greater part of its case law, based on precedent and on the decisions of successive Speakers, has been evolved to serve this end.

This case law, however, is only part of the law and practice of Parliamentary procedure. There is a more modern growth, a sort of statute law, which is embodied in the Standing Orders of the House. It is broadly true that of these two elements, whereas case law is concerned primarily with assuring the rights of private members in debate, Standing Orders are primarily directed to make possible the business of Government by securing to the Government sufficient parliamentary time for its dispatch. The Standing Orders were called into being by a change in the function of Parliament, slow in developing but early recognizable. The divorce of the executive from the legislature (apart from the limitations placed on the executive by the Commons' control of taxation) did not survive the evolution of the doctrine of responsibility of Ministers to Parliament. After the Whig revolution of 1688 this doctrine gained statutory acceptance, and by the eighteenth century was formally established. It is interesting to note that in the reign of Queen Anne an Act was

passed forbidding Ministers to sit in the House of Commons. The idea was to guarantee the independence of the Commons from ministerial control and interference; but the parliamentarians of those days were shrewd enough to see that the ultimate effect of such a measure would be to divorce the Commons from the real business of government, and thereby inevitably to decrease their power and responsibility. The Act was repealed and the doctrine of ministerial responsibility in both Houses, with an interesting emphasis on the Commons, became a statutory reality. The necessary corollary of ministerial responsibility to Parliament is the Government's need of an increasing amount of parliamentary time, in which to obtain parliamentary approval for the policy pursued by the Government and for legislation initiated by it in furtherance of its policy.

In view of the empirical nature of the development of parliamentary procedure it is not to be wondered at that its necessary revision failed to keep pace with the change in the function of Parliament. The doctrine of ministerial responsibility, with all that it involved in the change in character of the House of Commons, from an assembly of private members to the Chamber in which the main business of government was scrutinized, was firmly established in the eighteenth century. By the early nineteenth century the process of modification of procedure had begun; but the rights of private members still loomed large, and a meticulous exercise by private members of all their rights in debate might have seriously handicapped the business of government. The main motive force of that part of our procedure which is contained in Standing Orders has been, as was shown above, the securing to the Government of sufficient parliamentary time. It is not surprising, therefore, that Standing Orders made their appearance with the Reform Parliament, by which time the difficulty of ensuring efficient discharge of Government business with the procedure almost wholly designed to favour private members was already apparent. From this time, for about half a century, the process of adjustment between the rights of Government and the rights of private members was continually if slowly being adjusted in favour of the former by the enactment of further Standing Orders.

This tendency was greatly accelerated by the obstructionist tactics of the Irish Party in the 1880's. There was nothing particularly remarkable about their tactics except for the thoroughness and single-mindedness with which they pursued them. The advantage of parliamentary procedure still lay with private members, if they were sufficiently careless of the business of government, or sufficiently hostile to it, to apply these methods ruthlessly. The natural consequence of this exploitation by Irish members was to sharpen the use by the Government of its counter-weapon of Standing Orders. It was possible for the Government, faced by the possibility of breakdown in executive business due to the deliberately obstructive tactics of a minority party, to use its majority for securing the revision of the procedure by Standing

orders. This, in fact, is what happened in the 1880's; and the Standing Orders then produced set the seal on parliamentary procedure, as a method of trying to preserve the balance in the conduct of debate and in the distribution of parliamentary time between the necessities of Government and the rights of private members.

This period of accelerated development was marked by an advance on two points, the evolution of the idea of standing committees, and the introduction of the guillotine.

Standing committees had their origin in the 1880's first as a temporary measure and then as a permanent part of the procedure of Parliament. From time to time their compositions and duties have been revised and re-fashioned; but they remain in essence a method of saving the time of Parliament as a whole, by delegating to comparatively small standing committees sitting in the mornings the duty of the detailed consideration of a Bill, clause by clause, which is known in the jargon of Parliament as its committee stage. Such standing committees are in effect a Parliament in miniature, the Party representation being exactly proportionate to the strength of parties in the House, and the Chairman sitting in a neutral capacity, though himself a party Member of Parliament.

The guillotine, perhaps a little more difficult to understand, is only the popular or perhaps, more strictly, unpopular description of this parliamentary device. The proper name for a guillotine motion is an Allocation of Time motion, which prescribes the exact and maximum time by which the deliberations on any particular stage of a Bill must be completed. The name guillotine has arisen because of the inexorable way in which the closure falls at the prescribed time irrespective of circumstances. The Allocation of Time, or guillotine, motion draws up the timetable for the particular stage of the Bill, so that at the end of the time allotted (or of each day's proceedings if the guillotine takes the form of a closure of the Bill by compartments) the guillotine falls and all Government amendments are voted on without discussion and all opposition or private members' amendments are automatically rejected without being moved or put to the vote. It is not surprising that this ruthless method of curtailing parliamentary discussion in the interests of the dispatch of Government business has been generally unpopular with parliamentarians, to whom free discussion is the breath of life and the prime justification for its existence. In view of its general unpopularity, and of the distinct departure from the old tendency of parliamentary procedure always to safeguard the rights of private members, the guillotine has normally been sparingly used, and to a large extent its use until very recent times has been superseded by the acceptance of a voluntary timetable between the Government and the Opposition for the discussion of any particular Bill.

In particular the guillotine procedure has been less used than what is graphically and descriptively known as the kangaroo procedure. The origin of this

can be found in Standing Order 26 Sub-Paragraph 3, which was known as the kangaroo closure procedure and is in effect a forerunner of the guillotine. This procedure fell into disuse, however, and was largely replaced by the provisions of Standing Order 28 which is the kangaroo. This enables Speaker or Chairman to select amendments, leaping over those which he does not choose for discussion. The kangaroo procedure is described in the fourteenth edition of *Erskine May* as being very effective in saving time and as being applied by the Chair in entire independence of Government initiative. It will be seen, therefore, that the kangaroo saves parliamentary time, but does not in fact lend itself to the degree of control by the Government which is given by the guillotine.

The two main methods of adjusting the balance between the Government's need of time and private members' rights, evolved during the last half century, were parallel; they were not combined until March of this year, when the guillotine was used in the proceedings of standing committees. It was made clear by Mr. Arthur Greenwood, when moving the guillotine procedure motion on the Transport and Town and Country Planning Bills on March 3 last, that it was the first occasion on which an allocation of time order had been proposed in relation to a Bill in standing committee. Indeed traditional reluctance to guillotine a Bill in standing committee was well illustrated in the National Insurance Bill in 1911, which was peculiar in that one part of the Bill was retained on the floor of the House and the other was sent upstairs to a standing committee. In consequence of this one half of the Bill was in its committee stage subject to the guillotine, while the other half, which had been committed concurrently to a standing committee upstairs, was allowed to go on its way unhampered by this procedure.

The reluctance to use the guillotine in the proceedings of standing committees was overcome for the first time in regard to the Transport and Town and Country Planning Bills this year. The effect of the motion carried on March 3 was to draw up a timetable in the standing committees. The motion ordered the committee stage on these Bills to be concluded on or before April 2, leaving the detailed timetable of the Bills within the general limit to be worked out by the business sub-committees of the standing committees concerned. These business sub-committees were constituted under the session orders, and consist of a chairman of the standing committee with a small number of members, again in proportion to the strength of the parties in the House. The main consequences of enforcing this timetable procedure were, first, the compression of a large number of sittings into a very short space of time with the necessity of afternoon sittings being held in addition to the normal morning sittings; and, secondly, that a rigid guillotine procedure was adopted with the consequence that a large number of Government amendments were carried without any discussion, by the mere machinery of majority voting and a large number of opposition amendments were rejected without a

discussion by the committee at all.

It would not be right to say that these proposals came upon the House like a thunderbolt from a clear sky. It had been widely realized that consideration must be given to the difficulty in which any Government might be placed by the press of legislative business inevitable in the immediate aftermath of war. For this reason the coalition Government had considered a scheme designed to meet the special circumstances of the period of transition from war to peace. The scheme which they worked out (but which in fact did not receive the War Cabinet's approval) recommended certain modifications in parliamentary procedure which might be tried on an experimental basis during the first one or two sessions after the war. This scheme was then considered by the Select Committee on Procedure which was set up in the first month of the meeting of the new Parliament in 1945. Among the proposals considered by this committee were that machinery should be prepared for prescribing and enforcing a time limit on the proceedings of the standing committee, and that certain minor amendments should be made in the procedure and practice of debates in committee.

In regard to the proposals for an increase in the sessions of a standing committee, the select committee in its first report considered that the proposals that standing committees should sit three days a week should be regarded as experimental to relieve congestion. So far as afternoon proceedings were concerned, however, they recommended a revival of Standing Order No. 49a which had fallen into disuse. This Standing Order made possible the adjournment of the House after question time until the evening so that the intervening afternoon period could be used for the work of standing committees. They also recommended the possibility of seven simultaneous standing committees, a recommendation that for various reasons has not been followed up. Nor in fact has the procedure of Standing Order 49a been found suitable to the contemporary needs of Parliament. As can be seen its usefulness depends on the assumption that there will be some periods in which there is so little business for Parliament as a whole that the House is able to adjourn for several hours to allow the committees to sit in the afternoon. This has never yet happened, and at present there appears no likelihood at all in the foreseeable future that it will happen.

The Select Committee envisaged the possibility of the guillotine being at times necessary in the proceedings of standing committees; and in such cases they recommended that the detailed allocation of the sittings to parts of the bill should be worked out by the business sub-committee of the standing committee.

What has in fact been done in the standing committees dealing with the Transport and Town and Country Planning Bills has therefore been in excess of anything contemplated by the Select Committee on Procedure. The guillotine itself has, it is true, followed the lines indicated in the report on the Select

Committee on Procedure. It has, however, been applied together with not only the three morning sittings a week, but also with two or more afternoon sittings. These afternoon sittings have not taken place during a temporary adjournment of the House for that purpose, as contemplated by Standing Order 49a; they have, on the contrary, taken place during the sitting time of the House, and not infrequently simultaneously with debates of the first importance on the floor of the House itself, thus placing members serving on these standing committees in the dilemma of divided loyalties.

It is interesting to observe how the guillotine procedure has worked out in practice in the case of these two Bills. By a curious coincidence the number of clauses on which no discussion took place at all was the same in the case of both Bills; that is to say, thirty-seven clauses had no discussion at all, while in the Transport Bill seven schedules, and in the Town and Country Planning Bill six schedules, likewise received no discussion. In addition to the parts of the Bills which received no discussion at all as a result of the guillotine, many discussions on clauses and amendments were curtailed for the same reason. What is interesting is that to some extent the opposition members on the two committees proceeded on a somewhat different technique. Broadly speaking the members of the standing committee of the Transport Bill tried to give some discussion to as many points as possible, whereas the opposition members on the standing committee of the Town and Country Planning Bill chose rather to shape their course as if the proceedings were not subject to the guillotine. I do not want to press this distinction too far, as the arrangement of the timetable by the business sub-committee of the Town and Country Planning Bill naturally took into account the desirability of securing the maximum possible debate on the most important matters. Nevertheless, I think that, in spite of two rather different approaches to the conduct of the proceedings, substantially the same result was ultimately arrived at. The conclusion is inescapable that the committee stage of Bills, simultaneously subjected both to the guillotine and to a multiplication and concentration of sittings, is inherently unsatisfactory. It is in fact impossible in such circumstances to get a full and valuable discussion; and what discussion there is inevitably assumes an air of unreality. For example, it is neither logical nor workmanlike to have a fairly full discussion on perhaps two clauses, followed by the guillotining without discussion of the following three or four clauses of equal or comparable importance. The only alternative to this is a timetable system which would give a series of discussions on each of the clauses or amendments so short as to be entirely superficial, and incapable of providing the degree of detailed scrutiny which is at once the purpose and justification of the committee stage.

It was not solely the application of the guillotine which made the proceedings on these Bills in committee so difficult and so unsatisfactory. At least an equally important reason is to be found in the practice of sitting five times a week. This meant, in addition to the three morning sittings which

The Select Committee on Procedure had advocated as an exceptional expedient sitting on two afternoons simultaneously with the sitting of the House itself. The effect of this was to impose an almost intolerable burden both on the administrative machine in respect of the printing of amendments and report of proceedings, and also on the members serving on the committees. With all the other duties which fall to the lot of a Member of Parliament, it proved in practice difficult to the point of impossibility for members to keep pace with the progress of the committee and be able to give of their best in reasoned argument on so quick a succession of debates on matters of detailed complexity. It is common ground that the two Bills were in fact improved even by the degree of attention that they received in these very abbreviated committee proceedings; and it is also very widely admitted that they could have been improved considerably more by a less savagely curtailed and more realistic discussion in committee.

Nobody who believes in full and free discussion as an essential and valued element in the system of parliamentary democracy can doubt that the result of this experiment has been unfortunate and unsatisfactory. Two questions in particular present themselves for answer. First, should the compression of sittings into so short a space of time, with the necessary corollary of afternoon sessions during the sittings of the House, be abandoned? Secondly, should the guillotine procedure of the committee stage of Bills be discontinued? The first question is the easier and must, I think, clearly be answered in the affirmative. The pace was too hectic to be compatible with the thorough detailed scrutiny which is the main function of the committee stage. The proceedings of the sub-committee must be taken at a gentler pace; and, in particular, the experiment of afternoon sittings, other than during an adjournment of the House for that purpose as envisaged by the Select Committee on Procedure, must be discontinued.

It is more difficult to give a direct answer to the second question. It would, I think, probably be wrong, and certainly a departure from the recommendations of the Select Committee on Procedure, to argue from the unsatisfactory nature of the guillotine proceedings on these two Bills that the guillotine should never be applied to the committee stage of Bills. In principle, it is probably right that the machinery of the guillotine should be kept in reserve for the committee stage of Bills but only sparingly brought into action. In any event, it should never be coupled with the sort of concentration of sittings that was enforced in the case of the two Bills under examination.

Having said this, the question remains: how then can a mammoth programme of legislation be dealt with by Parliament? It is hard to give a wholly satisfactory answer to such a question. It is to be hoped that such programmes will be rare; and certainly if the history of the inter-war period repeats itself, the legislative congestion of the immediate post-war can be expected to thin out in the process of time. Legislation is after all not the only business of

Parliament, and certainly is not the only, nor indeed the main, business of Government or of the Civil Service. It is perhaps hard doctrine for the ardent legislative reformer, but it is nevertheless undeniably true that too much and too hurried legislation brings with it the inevitable penalty of a decrease in the speed and efficiency of administration. To argue that the parliamentary machine must be capable of adapting itself to any legislative programme, however large, is to overlook entirely the logistics of the question, which are in fact as vital and as inescapable in the practice of government as in the waging of war. Parliament must always expect to revise and improve its procedure in order to keep up with contemporary requirements. If, in spite of this, the parliamentary machine cannot discharge the burden placed upon it in conformity with the highest standards of parliamentary democracy, the remedy must be sought elsewhere. Governments must, however unwillingly, cut their legislative coat more strictly according to their administrative cloth.

(The author, a barrister, is Member of Parliament for Hereford.)

TO-DAY IN THE MINES

BY B. L. COOMBES

It is not too early to consider the miners' re-action to the new control, for the feeling of nationalization was around and about our mines long before the actual vesting ceremony at the beginning of this year. We knew the new control was coming and had prepared our ways for that change. Many of us had talked and hoped for nationalization during the last troubled years of mining for we believed that it was our sole hope of a better future and a more contented industry. Our hopes became a fact so swiftly that we were dubious if it could be correct, but by this time we have become used to the new control.

How do we feel about it after the working of these past months? We find sunshine, and shadows, in it. Most surely it is not the type of nationalization that most miners hoped for and desired. We expected a type of workers' control in which the men who produced the coal would have a say in its production and a voice in the methods to be used. During the first stages there was a sign of co-operation and a desire to suggest things which would ensure more efficient working. Lately there has been a slackening of that interest and a growing feeling that mining is slipping back to the old ways—under a control which is supposed to be different but has many of the old smells about it.

In many ways we feel it is just the name over the business that has changed while the management and the methods have gone on as before. We felt that if the old control was adjudged inefficient a change should be made to new management as swiftly as possible. There seems little sign of this and we are feeling somewhat bitter about it. We refuse to admit that there are not men amongst the best types of miners who would be able to improve conditions and outputs in the actual coal workings. Who should be more able than the men who have spent their lives in close contact with the coal? Yet we see position after position given to men whose main qualification seems to be that they know nothing of the craft of mining. This thing is becoming a joke in the mine workings, but it is a cynical joke which will boil slowly up into trouble unless some change in appointments is made.

We agree that our knowledge of the selling side and the distributive part of our industry is small and that in those sections we must allow past experience to have a preference. We do not complain about that but we are worried over this tendency to count the workers once again as only fit to use a shovel and swallow pit dust. Already this matter of appointments has brought a series of protests and some stoppages; these will be intensified unless some new method

is adopted. We see a new managing class coming into being—amongst them many of the old ones professing a new outlook—and these seem even more autocratic and no more efficient than the control they have replaced; but they appear more opulent and act in the confidence that this time the Government and the country will support their methods. In fact some of the Coal Board officials help foster that attitude in their frequent public speeches and they give us the feeling that the actual miner is a person who does not matter very much.

We still have faith in Mr. Shinwell and the leaders who have remained with us. That is why the stoppages have been so few and the output kept going so well despite all difficulties. We feel that Mr. Shinwell is sincere in his desire to give us a better life but we also feel that he has been badly advised and that most of his propaganda—whoever was responsible—was more suited for backward children than for an army of workers who are usually intelligent and politically keen. Much of the effort by the miners during the crisis was inspired by the hope of making nationalization a success. Sunday working of coal was a breach of custom which showed how eager the men were. Repairs have always been done on Sundays in the past but it was sacrilege to permit the filling of coal on the Sabbath. They surrendered that custom and several others in the time of need. Many made long and exhausting journeys to work across snowbound mountain roads and slept near the collieries when transport failed. Many men even now struggle to work when they should rest because they realize what is at stake. It is a pity that the miners are not given publicity that is worthy of adult reading and that more men worthy of their esteem were not included amongst the Coal Board officials.

In our own case we know that output could be speeded up by half if we could get more power underground. Our machines cannot travel at full speed and our haulage engines can move only a small load because the compressed air power is not sufficient. More than a year ago I was one of a workmen's committee that asked for a section of the mine to be electrified so that the rest of the power could be used at the inside workings. It would have solved our problems and the management agreed. We have been stirring it along ever since and the last report is that we may be able to get the necessary equipment before another two years. It is a tale of worn machinery and worn men. Yet every day we see new electrical equipment and poles being fixed for outside industry.

We have been told that extra supplies of food are being, or have been, allotted to colliery areas. It seems they must have lost their way for we have not had them. This matter of colliery canteens is not quite so simple as it appears. In these days a very large proportion of our miners travel a long way to work. They come to our pits from a radius of twenty miles. Often the bus or the train bringing one shift must wait to take the miners from the offcoming shift home. So in the half hour between shifts there is a deal of crowding and confusion. The canteen is crowded with men who want their food boxes

led or some refreshment before going to work; or by men from the shift which has just ended and who want something before they start homeward. In this bustle many men have to go without. I am very fond of that early cup of tea and as my journey home takes about an hour I need something warm before I start. Yet I count myself lucky to get two cups of tea in a week. I have thirty-five minutes between leaving the pit mouth until I get into my bus—a quarter of an hour from pit to the baths, then strip, bath, and dress again into clean clothes. At the most I have five minutes in the canteen. If there is any crowd I go without my tea. This is quite the average case so it seems silly to blame us for not making more use of the canteen. Some of our canteens, too, need more experienced managers.

It would seem reasonable to suggest a revision of the time tables of our conveyances but that is not easy. In most cases they have to merge into the other passenger services and always they have to collect miners at the other collieries further along the valleys. The folk who live close to the colliery get the benefit and, naturally, the outsiders do not feel happy about it.

We have had benefits under the new control. We do not now pay our tentance a week for the pithead baths and the paid holidays have been extended. Many other things have been promised and with the passing of time they will be granted. The five day week is with us and we are becoming aware of fresh problems. Before it started we had passed many nights trying to provide for the snags which we knew from experience would occur. Now it is operating we are meeting problems we did not expect. We feel some sense of surprise that many papers and a large section of the public appear to think that we are the first to be given a five day week. A little reflection will show how wrong that suggestion is. I know of industries in which the five day week has been recognized for many years and what of the clean collar jobs in which five days every week are counted as using up all a man's energy? So in some ways our five day week is just the getting in line with other people.

I have no doubt that for some months a loss of coal output must be the result of this shortened week. When sufficient new machinery gets working the loss may be eased but that will take time. It was an awkward position but from the urgent need of coal I have felt Mr. Shinwell would have had justification in asking for a postponement of the change. He preferred to keep his pledges to the miners and that was an honourable attitude. Otherwise he might have lost the faith we place in him and brought a feeling of distrust into the industry. We have had too many broken promises in the past and I hope that the Minister will not have cause for regret. I have wondered if it would not have been better to grant the shortened week and then treat the sixth day as an extra day—with pay—worked to ease our coal shortage until supplies became more plentiful.

It must be the dayshift coal getters who will see the chief changes, as in South Wales many afternoon or night workers have worked a five shift week for years.

Their position will not be altered or their pay. These men have had experience of the bonus shift and they are not fond of that system. In the past a man might work until the last shift, then be taken suddenly ill; or his wife or child might be dying, yet his failure to work that last shift would be penalized as if he had idled deliberately. Apart from accident or trade union work no excuse was accepted and he was paid four shifts instead of six. What were the reactions to this bonus cropping? In most cases the miner realized all hope of a full week had gone so he made a holiday of it by stopping away the remaining part of the week. It is illogical, I know, but the men seemed to have some idea of getting a kick back at the penalty.

Our committee meetings lately have heard a lot about what the officials term "ironing out". I will try to explain this new idea. In the past one colliery manager might have granted a small regular payment for some special co-operation such as working over-width. He got much better results by that extra payment. Another colliery manager might be opposed to that special payment but had made the difference up in some other way which brought equal results. These points had been amicably arranged and so had become part of pit custom—and mining men are tight on preserving customs. Now the Coal Board is trying to iron out these customs so that a dead level can be arranged. Under the unified control it would not be possible to grant men in one pit what was not given to those in another pit because that would mean increasing the custom payments and so the tendency seems to be to wipe out all such customs. The men are accepting this reluctantly because they realize the difficulties of the new control but it does not make things any pleasanter and there seems a possibility of them asking for a little more lenient ironing. That bonus shift I mentioned for night and afternoon workers is one example. It was originally granted in South Wales as an offset to the loss of social life and pleasure the men suffered by working those awkward shifts, but under the new control they will not have that one shift less to work than those on the ordinary day shift. Another effect is that in the past many types of underground workers had a sort of job and finish agreement. When the conveyor was shifted or the coal cul cleared they went home even if it was an hour before finishing time. That is another custom which is being ironed out. There are already many such alterations and the miners are beginning to feel that the five day week is not altogether such a grand idea as it had first seemed.

Above all there is one overriding grievance—the present wage system. The beginner in the mines if he is over twenty-one must have five pounds a week. The skilled miner, with the knowledge of twenty or thirty years of experience behind him can only claim one shilling a day more as skilled money. It is a ridiculous position—one shilling a day between a highly efficient man who can tackle most jobs underground and another man who has to be guided, watched, and guarded whilst he does the most unskilled work! The skilled man must accept responsibility and must also find his own set of tools and keep

men in condition. As a result no men will accept the job of repairer or similar tasks if they can possibly avoid it. Yet the most urgent need is for colliery repairers. Most of them at present are middle-aged men and the cream of the mining industry. They are the most thoughtful and the ones most active both in politics and in trade union affairs. Our leaders agree that the present position is unfair and have promised an alteration when a new wage agreement is formed. It is a credit to our craftsmen that they are patiently, though not silently, enduring this state of affairs.

Where the coal-getters are concerned some of the managements have tried to alter the position by paying a higher rate per ton on the coal; the idea being to increase the coal output and help the wage. It has had that effect but has brought a snag which disturbs every one of our committee meetings. You see, under machine mining conditions coal getting is becoming one of the easiest and least skilful of mining jobs and so young and partly experienced men can do it if there is a strengthening of experienced men in the gang to watch safety. These conveyor gangs can earn good money—sometimes twice as high as the repairers. Yet when the more skilled work of repairer needs to be done the repairers must come along to do it so that the coal-getters can continue to work—and the repairers must make things safe for men of half their experience getting twice their wage. It rankles.

It may not be easy for an outsider to realize what work the colliery repairer does. Where the roof is crushing he must be there to build extra supports to steady the pressure. He must clear falls and re-timber or re-arch the part underneath so that it is safe for men and coal to travel. He must build and repair the underground engine houses; in our pit we have thirty of these and some of them are fine examples of skilful work. He must build walls, blast for extra width or height, and every day be ready to meet some new emergency. Almost every shift he works in extreme danger so that the places and the roadways shall be right for the handling of coal next day. The actual coal-getter who does not need one quarter of the repairer's skill is the type of man who now gets one shilling a day extra.

We have told the managements that this must be changed, that the repairers must have the chance to work on the coal and so earn more money. They agree without any argument that things must be altered but if they take the skilled men off repairs the colliery must stop. They ask us to find men to replace them, then the repairers can go to the coal-getting. They know, and we know, that there is no hope of replacement for the skilled and experienced miners are scarce, and getting more scarce every year. They cannot be replaced, for a generation of mining craft is in their strong hands and cool heads. They have fought the mountain all their lives and what we have lost by not having their sons to work with them will take a generation to replace. That is the fault of the past, not the Coal Board.

INCENTIVES TO WORK

BY G. F. McCLEARY

AT a recent sitting of the B.B.C. "Brains Trust" the subject of incentives to work came up for discussion. One member said that many people worked for the love of it. He mentioned, as examples, cabinet ministers and newspaper editors, who, he thought, lived laborious days because of the impelling interest of their work.

It is natural that men and women who have achieved the intellectual eminence that leads to a seat on the "Brains Trust" should think nobly of work; and to the examples given there might have been added the creative artist. Think of the stupendous output of Walter Scott, who was hailed by Wilkie Collins, himself a distinguished novelist, as "King, Emperor, and God Almighty of novelists." Think also of the still more stupendous output of Handel and Sebastian Bach. Handel's father, who was a barber-surgeon, forbade his son to have anything to do with music, which he regarded as hardly respectable; he intended him to be a lawyer. But a well-wisher of the gifted child came to his rescue. He smuggled into an attic of the father's house a clavichord, inaudible behind closed doors, on which the young genius practised after the family had gone to bed. Of such rare spirits we can say, as Whitman said to the solitary thrush singing "by himself a song":

For well, dear brother, I know,

If thou wast not granted to sing thou would'st surely die.

To work for the love of the job is, however, hardly to be expected from those following some occupations. The youthful Handel may have got up at night to work at the clavicord, but it is doubtful whether many colliers ever felt a strong impulse to get up at night to work away at the coal face. A newspaper editor may find deep spiritual satisfaction in moving from his daily pulpit the minds of his fellow citizens; but it seems unlikely that many scavengers derive much satisfaction from moving the household refuse of their fellow citizens. Yet it is not necessary to be exceptionally gifted to love "The daily round, the common task." We may doubt whether cabinet ministers or newspaper editors derive from their work a more profound satisfaction than the French peasant does from his. If you find this difficult to believe, read the famous extract from Michelet's *Le Peuple* quoted by J. S. Mill in his *Principles of Political Economy*:

If we would know the inmost thought, the passion, of the French peasant, it is very easy. Let us walk out on Sunday into the country and follow him. Behold him

yonder, walking in front of us. It is two o'clock; his wife is at vespers; he has on his Sunday clothes; I perceive that he is going to visit his mistress.

What mistress? His land.

I do not say he goes straight to it. No, he is free to-day, and may either go or not. Does he not go every day in the week? Accordingly, he turns aside, he goes another way, he has business elsewhere. And yet—he goes.

It is true, he was passing close by; it was an opportunity. He looks, but apparently he will not go in; what for? And yet—he enters.

At least it is probable that he will not work; he is in his Sunday dress; he has a clean shirt and blouse. Still, there is no harm in plucking up this weed and throwing out that stone. There is a stump, too, which is in the way; but he has not his tools with him, he will do it to-morrow.

Then he folds his arms and gazes, serious and careful. He gives a long, a very long look, and seems lost in thought. At last, if he thinks himself observed, if he sees a passer-by, he moves slowly away. Thirty paces off he stops, turns round, and casts on his land a last look, sombre and profound, but to those who can see it, the look is full of passion, of heart, of devotion.

But the peasant proprietor is coming to be looked upon merely as a survival of an unscientific and uneconomic past. The march of progress is passing him by. In Soviet Russia, after a short period of toleration, he has been liquidated. Mechanization has revolutionized agriculture. In the great food producing countries the number of workers required to cultivate a given area of land has rapidly diminished. Surprising economies in man power have been made by the ever increasing use of machinery in agriculture. In transport and industrial production mechanization is of older origin and has proceeded much further, especially since the war of 1914-18. In office work, too, the use of machines has been much extended. When I came to London in 1901 as a medical officer of health, there was not one typewriter in the town hall in which I worked.

Mechanization, despite its manifold advantages, has taken something precious out of human life. When, in the middle of the sixteenth century, Hans Sachs made shoes for Eva Pognor and Sextus Beckmesser in Nuremberg, the shoemaker built up the whole shoe with his own hands. He knew the customer for whom he was making it. Those who wore what he had produced were friends or acquaintances. In the street or in the home he could see the finished result of his craftsmanship. Now, each shoemaker produces a mere fraction only of the whole shoe, and of those who will wear it he knows and cares nothing. Hans Sachs could vary the intensity and tempo of his work. In the second act of *Die Meistersinger* he breaks off to sing a glorious song. ("Give me the man who sings at his work," said Carlyle.) The up-to-date shoemaker cannot vary the intensity and tempo of his work. It is essential that he should keep pace with his mates in the line of production. And as to breaking off to sing a song—! Hans Sachs, in short, was a skilled craftsman; he had the joy of productive craftsmanship, one of the most precious of human possessions. The modern worker is more and more becoming the semi-skilled tender of an automatic machine.

Many years ago Henry Nevinson, walking with me on Hampstead Heath,

lamented over the "dehumanizing" influence of mechanized industry, which, he contended, had taken away much of the joy of work. I ventured to suggest that it might be to some extent counteracted by shortening the hours of labour, so that the workers with more free time of their own might derive from leisure more of the joy of life. He would have none of it. "No", he said, "that's no way out. What really matters to a man is his work."

He was doubtless right; and certainly at the present time my suggestion fails to meet the case. The problem we now face is how to get the maximum production out of a limited number of workers fed by a limited quantity of energy-building food stuffs. The President of the Board of Trade has told us that it will be necessary to increase our production by seventy-five per cent. to attain the standard of living we had attained before the war. It was not a very high standard, not the kind of standard we hoped to attain. But it will be hard enough to regain it. We are living on borrowed money. The American loan is being spent more rapidly than was expected. A bright young economist once assured me that the whole science of economics is based on the proposition that you can't eat your cake and have it. "It seems simple," he added, "but it has important implications, one of which is that you can't have your cake until it has been produced."

In the Graeco-Roman civilization, which was based on slave labour, the chief incentive to industry was the lash. The master had the power of life and death over his slaves, and flogging was a comparatively mild punishment for the failure of a slave to fulfil his master's requirements. But in Rome in the later years of the Republic and in the Empire the slave had another incentive to do his best for his master—he might win his freedom. The freeing of slaves became more and more common. For the most part, the slaves did not differ widely from their masters in race or colour. Some were as well educated as their masters, some better educated. After gaining their freedom they became part of the Roman citizenry; some, like Trimalchio, became wealthy citizens. In the Negro slavery of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the position of the slave was very different. He had little or no prospect of becoming freed. In some places it was made a crime to teach him to read or write. The incentive to work was the lash.

When the lash ceased to be used for that purpose a new incentive appeared in the fear of the "sack". The sack might be even more terrifying than the lash, for it might be followed by starvation. But the sack has now lost much of the fear it inspired when Charles Dickens threw the search-light of his genius upon the conditions in which the poor then lived and worked. With the development of social services and of organized labour combinations the fear of the sack has weakened; and the enormous increase in the number of government employees, central and local, has limited the field of employment in which the incentive of the sack can be applied. It is not easy to sack the holder of a position that is permanent and pensionable. He may, it is true, be passed over when

promotions are made; but that consideration appeals with varying effect to different workers. Those with simple tastes and no lofty ambitions may not be particularly anxious to shoulder the increased responsibilities that go with increased status. They may prefer a life of not too strenuous humdrum routine to a life of intellectual excitement in the performance of duties involving the making home of papers for after-office study and the making of difficult decisions in which momentous consequences may depend.

Then there is the incentive, which still survives and is potent in America, that a man may by hard work become the hero of what Americans call "a success story"—a story that tells of some boy who, though born in poverty, achieves fame and fortune,

Who breaks his birth's invidious bar,
And grasps the skirts of happy chance,
And breasts the blows of circumstance,
And grapples with his evil star;

Who makes by force his merit known
And lives to clutch the golden keys,
To mould a mighty state's decrees,
And shape the whisper of the throne

American boys are brought up in the belief that every American citizen has a chance of becoming President of the United States. But since the Republic was founded only a hundred and fifty years ago, the number of citizens who have risen to that high office is but thirty-two. It is true that many other citizens have become millionaires, and even multi-millionaires, or have in other ways achieved exceptionally distinguished success, but in the aggregate they form only an insignificant fraction of the total number of competitors. The modern man has become more realistic. He is less inclined to "scorn delights and live laborious days" in the hope of winning a competition in which the odds against an average man are probably many thousands to one. More and more he is inclined to aim, not at fame and fortune but at permanency and a pension.

In seeking incentives to work, we need not trouble ourselves about such workers as Tennyson's "divinely gifted man", who broke "his birth's invidious bar"; they need no incentive. The problem is how to appeal to the average man, who, though not afraid of hard work if it is really required, feels a desire for more time to enjoy his home-life, social intercourse, and the simple delights of the cricket field, the football field, and the greyhound racing track.

In Russia, where much attention has been given to devising incentives to production, striking results have, it is said, been obtained from encouraging groups of workers to compete against each other to produce the largest output in a given time. There are competitions between different groups in the same factory, between factory and factory, between city and city. The "shock brigade" is regarded as another potent stimulus to increased output. Shock brigades are groups of workers who volunteer to make special efforts to increase

production. They not only work in their own places of work but make ginger-ing-up visits to other undertakings :

They work with furious intensity, shaming the other workers in the shop into putting more regularity and continuity into their efforts They do not usually receive or expect extra payment for their exceptional efforts, although on a piece-work basis their total earnings at the standard rates are naturally greater than those of the average workman. They find their reward in the public approval and the honours accorded to them They get the best chance of receiving theatre tickets or being sent on holiday excursions They often enjoy the amenity of a separate dining-room in the factory restaurant, sometimes with flowers on the table, electro-plated spoons and forks, and special dainties.*

Workers who have made contributions of exceptional importance to increased productivity are accorded marks of public approval far exceeding the privilege of taking their meals in a flower-decked room apart from the mere rank and file of the workers. They are given wide publicity. Their portraits appear in the newspapers. They may be awarded decorations. They may, like Stakhanov, become national heroes. But there is nothing novel in bestowing public honours in reward of distinguished services to the community. In Russia : " What is novel is the extensive use made of the incentive of organized public shaming of those who have fallen below the currently accepted standard of productive efficiency."† Mr. Harry F. Ward, an American journalist, has given examples of how this incentive is applied :

At Selmash I was stopped one day by a sign over the washroom : " This is where the lazy fellows smoke the machines away ". Another day, on a blackboard in the plough shop were three columns headed " Drunkards ", " Absentees ", " Lazy fellows ". Underneath were the names of the delinquents. They were caricatured—the drunkard with a big bottle, and the absentee sleeping in bed, and the lazy man with his head tied up pretending a toothache The drunkards and slackers have to get their pay at a special " Black window ", where they are jeered at by onlookers. Sometimes the place for receipt of wages is a hole cut in the middle of an enormous black bottle. At Selmash it was the mouth of an enormous red-nosed drinker, with a sign " At the Black Pay window all the lazy absentees, drunkards, and snatchers will get their pay on (such a date) ". To get it they had to mount steps and pass along a raised platform in full view. The children added to this publicity by coming into the factory and drawing caricatures of drunkards for the notice boards.‡

It seems unlikely that such incentives to increased production would be welcomed by British workers.

Much remains to be said on this difficult and important subject of incentive to work. Its importance was long strangely overlooked in standard economic writings. Mill, for example, regarded " aversion to labour " and the desire of every one " to obtain as much wealth as possible " as " perpetually antagonizing principles ", each acting with an equal degree of universality. But, as Henry Sidgwick pointed out, this view " is open to the obvious objection that man

* Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Soviet Communism*, third edition, 1944, pp. 608-609.

† Ibid, p. 618.

‡ Harry F. Ward, *In Place of Profit*, pp. 82-83 Cited by Sidney and Beatrice Webb in *Soviet Communism*, pp. 618-619.

persons get more happiness out of their work than they do out of a good deal of their expenditure."† Sidgwick also pointed out that the advocacy of peasant proprietorship by Mill and some of his followers sprang from their belief that the mere feeling of a peasant proprietor that he owns the land on which he works gives him a strong incentive to work quite apart from "the desire of wealth, which Mill and other economists treat as summing up all the springs of labour attributed to men in economic reasonings."* In his chapter on the causes of variations in production, Sidgwick gave an analysis of the motives that lead men to exertion and care in work, and showed that they are exceedingly varied in range and intensity. Incentives that appeal strongly to some workers may have little or no influence on others, and their effects may vary widely with changes of conditions. Since Sidgwick's time much attention has been given to industrial psychology, and we are now in a better position to devise incentives suitable to varying industrial conditions.

In attempting to formulate and apply such incentives, it is necessary to bear in mind that work is not essentially disagreeable. "Business", said Walter Bagehot, "is really more agreeable than pleasure; it interests the whole mind, the aggregate nature of man more continuously, and more deeply. But it does not *look* as if it did." Bagehot did not define the range of occupations that he regarded as "business"; but his remark is probably of wide application. Levenson was right when he said that what really matters to a man is his work. In Tokyo, a Japanese journalist once asked me to give him a message for the young people of Japan, and I replied: "Tell them to make their work their hobby." This advice, which seemed to delight the journalist, I still think sound. A man whose hobby is his work is thrice armed against "the whips and scorns of time." He is of those of whom Carlyle said: "Blessed is he who has found his work; let him ask no other blessedness."

† H. Sidgwick, *Principles of Political Economy*, third edition, p. 43.

* Ibid, p. 117.

"THE POETIC IMAGE"

BY JOHN ARLOTT

IN 1946 Mr. Day Lewis was invited to deliver the Clark Lectures at Cambridge: he has now issued his lectures in book-form.* In this volume he is free of the limitations which restricted his earlier work in criticism. *A Hope for Poetry* (1934), written from the comparative immaturity of thirty, was a partisan glove hurled in the teeth of the over-conservative traditionalists, who wielded such powerful disapproval against Mr. Day Lewis and his immediate fellow-writers. *Poetry For You*, a more recent volume, which has also reached a 'standard' acceptance, was addressed specifically to a reading-public demanding an introduction (or often, and more lamentably, a series of introductions and re-introductions) to poetry. The years between 1934 and 1946 which have seen the acceptance of Mr. Day Lewis's own poetry have removed the need for him to state a limited case and, simultaneously, engendered in him a wide appreciation of excellence of all types in poetry. This characteristic was present in the two preceding books but, from their very nature and aims, it was never stressed. In these lectures, however, the author was entitled to assume sympathy and an informed response in his audience.

A university lectureship has by no means always guaranteed a high literary or imaginative quality, nor even a magnanimous view. All too often the academic lecture has recounted spiritually valueless facts in an unjustifiably dull manner. Mr. E. M. Forster, whose own Clark Lectures on *Aspects of the Novel* were also a model of their kind, has said "Study . . . teaches us everything about a book except the central thing, and between that and us is raised a circular barrier which only the wings of the spirit can cross." It is this lamentable aspect of contemporary criticism which Mr. Day Lewis attacks not only forthrightly but also, tacitly and perhaps more effectively, by the quality of his own writing. The impact of his approach is startling after the spate of books which have handled poetry in the manner of a man who would dissect a woman's body to discover why he loved her. This approach has been most apparent in those German and Germanic-American 'critics' who have apparently decided that it is the office of the critic to be analyst rather than artist. The method has, too, been applied in this country, notably by Mr. I. A. Richards. The guarded word, the cold-blooded examination of an essentially warm-blooded art, have characterized writing in this field to a point at which readers must wonder whether the authors have ever felt any emotional

* *The Poetic Image* by C. Day Lewis. Cape. 7s. 6d.

sponse to poetry. Too often ideologies, subject-matter and sheer mechanics, legitimate as *byways* of poetic enquiry, have been extended to the exclusion of poetic experience. On this issue Mr. Day Lewis rejects pedagogic over-care:

I should make it clear I do not assume a uniformity of response to any given poem: one may, however, assume a certain common factor in the responses to a poem of all the individual readers for whom the poem has some meaning. That common factor—let us be rash, and burn our boats, and call it pleasure.

The manner of most modern critical writing makes this honest attitude almost startling. E. S. Dallas, a forgotten and minor Victorian critic, whom Mr. Day Lewis quotes and recommends made the point in *The Gay Science*. It is a genuine service to the reader of criticism to point out, or recall to him, the existence of Dallas. His approach is bold and human and his criticism made early and valid reference to the influence of the unconscious upon the poet. His books *The Gay Science* and *Poetics* have not been conspicuously excelled in their kind in modern times. Only the unsound variations of fashion, greater essentially perhaps from its nature in critical writing than in other branches of literature, has concealed him from modern readers.

Mr. Day Lewis also draws attention to the work of the American critic, John Livingston Lowes, another recommendation which should be echoed. His book on Coleridge, *The Road to Xanadu*, an unique and exciting detective story of the poetic-imagination, is too little known in England and rarely now published here. This is the rare example of minute scholarship becoming a work of imaginative creation. Lowes' *Chaucer, Convention and Revolt in Poetry* and *The Reading of Books* also deserve more attention.

Coming humanly as he does to his subject, Mr. Day Lewis is free to establish himself by carefully documented and argued points and then to draw the legitimate conclusion warmly; he does so with an enthusiasm which is most welcome. He makes strongly and directly the point that 'Modern Poetry' is not a strange object to be examined and explained in isolation as certain catch-penny 'guide-books' have claimed to do. This 'Modern Poetry' is neither more nor less than the present form of English poetry, stemming purely out of tradition. The attempted review of a ten-year period is no more true poetic criticism than a newspaper is true history—providing, like it, no more than the often ill-proportioned sketch map but a longer-sighter eye is needed to see it proportionately in the greater terrain.

Because these essays were originally lectures they have an unusually powerful first-impact effect. Unlike those misnamed 'lectures' which are read aloud and later printed for the comprehension of the original listeners, these have the true qualities of the spoken word. The sentences are always simple and there is an unbroken onward flow of speech, thought and argument. The reader is never pulled up by the rambling relative clause nor the finicking footnote: he has no need to follow a diffuse trail, the writing leads him. For all its warmth the voice of the book has dignity in its speech, even beside the

majesty of many of the quotations. For it is often by quotation that Mr. Day Lewis restates—as it is constantly necessary to re-state in every age—those great truths of literary criticism often missed by those who cannot see the wood for the blight-stains on a single leaf. He quotes these canons out of an impressive width and depth of reading—Coleridge, Goethe, Schiller, Dallas, Rilke, Dryden, A. C. Bradley—and others whose appearance initially surprises but which is tersely and satisfyingly justified. Hazlitt, whose matter and manner would have fitted these lectures admirably, is surprisingly neglected. Among the many poets quoted and examined are Meredith (justifying the author's enthusiasm in sensitively estimated extracts), Tennyson, Chaucer, Dylan Thomas and George Herbert. Again and again the critical points drive the reader back to re-examine a quotation with humility and new eyes.

The six essays isolate and identify the image and then examine the progress of poetry in relation to its use of imagery. The image as dominant, the image as instrument, are seen as variants in a pattern of poetry in which modern poetry reveals itself as legitimate, a normal development of the whole.

Impressive in his examination of poetry, Mr. Day Lewis is to be even more highly esteemed for his guidance through poetic processes. His own poetry, like this book, has a structural purity which undoubtedly derives from his classical studies. In his poetry he seems incapable of sinking (when he is not successful) below a level of extreme competence because his absorbed and rigidly self-imposed disciplines always produce soundness of structure. Many of the passages of this book show him moving with considerable certainty in regions which 'poetical' whimsy has sometimes attempted to wrap in mists of 'inspiration'. He shows the making of a poem as conscious selection and manipulation of the images the mind produces. He quotes Coventry Patmore's essay on William Barnes illuminatingly and happily:

The *curiosa felicitas* . . . which means the 'careful luck' of him who tries many words, and has the wit to know when memory, or the necessity of metre or rhyme, has supplied him unexpectedly with those which are perhaps even better than he knew how to desire.

A considerable humanising factor of this book is its humour. The pompous critic must alienate sympathy. But it is difficult for an imaginative man to be pompous in speech (as distinct from the essay read aloud which often passes for a 'lecture'). Mr. Day Lewis is too experienced a speaker to talk insensitively and he obviously used humour, which is unforced and charming, in order to establish sympathy with his audience. This same humour when printed still wins attention—its sincerity is beyond doubt. When he likens the faculty which brings images up into the consciousness to a woolly-witted dog the humour has a considerable image-value which he exploits effectively.

Re-reading shows the care with which these lectures have been prepared. There is an absence of 'padding' and of the hackneyed, unusual in lecture series. Basic truths are restated only to give the essential standards and

adjustments which maintain proportion. The tone throughout is that of a man discharging a welcome task upon which he has worked to the full extent of a well-equipped mind, with a deep feeling for his subject and a determination to offer his listeners the best at his command.

The establishment of trust is complete when the author says: "I have no reason to assume that the picture they give me . . . would occur to any other reader or was ever in the poet's mind" or again, "I am not at all sure that I can grasp its significance: the general *idea* it gives me is . . ." Yet, despite these disclaimers it will be an insensitive and dogmatic man who is not moved and won by the interpretations these essays offer.

With an academic audience there was an automatic assumption of a reasonable cultural standard. But, in Cambridge, was it to be safely assumed that minor diversionary tactics had not exerted a disproportionate influence upon critical values? Therefore every point is won: some of them would appear as truisms until the reader recalls books of criticism written from a standpoint which denied these very truths. Mr. Day Lewis takes his place on the highest plane of contemporary critics of poetry with C. M. Bowra, Edmund Wilson, John Livingstone Lowes and T. S. Eliot.

It is the poet who writes: "He writes a poem; then he moves on to the new experience, the next poem: and when a critic comes along and tells him what is right or wrong with that first poem he has a feeling of irrelevance . . . No poem ever contradicts another poem, any more than one experience can be contradicted by another."

It is the fully-equipped practitioner-critic who writes of the last four lines of George Herbert's *The Collar*: "Now functional imagery—the use of images to underline and bring home generally accepted ideas—produces its own kind of image pattern. It is a clear-cut, lucid pattern because images best serve ideas by being so disposed within it as to muffle all their associations except the one required."

It is the orderly thinker who says: "So we may say, provisionally, that mixed metaphors or incongruous images seem to be successful in proportion as they lack sensuous appeal."

It is a man of perceptive humour who says: "How disastrous if Wordsworth's football had been kicked into Gray's poem. The trouble with Wordsworth's football is that it is over-inflated, and bursts in itself in the effort to compete with larks and rainbows."

It is the enthusiast who says: ". . . the Romantics, because in their verse the freshness, the intensity, the evocativeness of image most prized by us to-day are seen at a height unequalled before their time and unsurpassed since."

And it is a mature human who says: "Look inward then, but outwards too no less steadily; for the virtues which unite mankind in families and societies are themselves variations of that single theme which also unifies your disjointed memories and warring moods to make a poem."

A JOURNEY THROUGH THE AIR

BY ASHLEY DUKES

"Having now come at last into these ample fields."

Burton, *The Anatomy of Melancholy*.

JOURNEYS fraught with varied scene and calling
Lengthen life, swift though a day of pleasure
Runs to sunset. In such overflowing
Fullness months and years are longer, falling
Lightly as dry leaves in wind-blown measure
Marking autumn's age and time of sowing;
Thus I make my fanciful digression
Of the air, birdlike in fair procession.

Let me as a falcon freely soaring,
Fetching ample circuits, buoyant ranging
On his course, myself ascend and hover
Ravenous above this world, exploring
From a height her seas and isles, unchanging
Poles and continents, that to a mind discover
Secrets hidden from the daily eye of travel,
Mysteries no earthly dweller can unravel.

Then from the summit of my flight descrying
Quarry far below, and poised stooping,
Let me swift and passionate, voracious
Fall on knowledge, merciless denying
Nothing to my eager maw, but hoping
Ever from the spur of a sagacious
Appetite to be more surely, faster,
And with good digestion, learning's master.

Let me survey that stone magnetical,
Polar or no, that sets a needle bending
In a compass, and discern the variation
With each place or time, and so heretical
Propound a doctrine. Let me airborne lending

Sailors aid (the pattern of our nation)
Learn if in truth there be a north-west passage
Through the Arctic, after Hudson's constant presage.

Let me confirm, in Marco Polo's diction,
Names of cities, plains and rivers, Tartar,
Indian or Chinese; and know of Prester
John his dwelling, whether truth or fiction;
View that Asian world of war and barter,
Ivored elephant and snake to pester
White humanity; and learn if Guinea
Be a land of pride or isle of ignominy.

For the Pacific seas and southerly
Islands, I reserve them for some later
Kingdoms or republics to inherit,
Praying their statecraft be more brotherly
Than ours, as may become a greater
Habitation and a race of merit;
Over Madagascar give me hope of viewing
My sister roc, whose giant egg is her undoing.

Whence is the fount of Nilus, and the tidal
Vehemence resurgent in each bay and sea,
Calm or tempestuous? Whence arisen
The flow of inland lakes that idle
Lie embracing rivers? By what fantasy
Runs a wayward current in such prison?
Where stands earth's topmost mountain, perpendicular
By measurement, with site particular?

Does any Eldorado thrive, or womanly
Amazon wage war? Exists a soundless
Storm in Muscovy, or an Arabian phoenix rising
Out of ashes? Are such legends humanly
No more than allegories of the boundless
Riches of God's universe still surprising
Man, and germinant in his imagination
Fondly manifesting the entire Creation?

By the Egyptian pyramids or Lucullan
Fishponds let me mark the crane and swallow,
How they fly at seasons, whence and whither,

A JOURNEY THROUGH THE AIR

Learning if where they host at sullen
 Autumnal dawn, the last to come must wallow
 In his blood and lose his pride of feather
 For tarrying the rest upon a mission
 Intuitive as my own, relentless in volition.

Are Russians known, who through their winter sleepers
 Lie insensible, until with spring renewing
 Life again? And why are found in caverns
 High on mountain-tops, the bones of reapers
 With their hooks? Or even, stranger tales pursuing,
 Sailors with anchors, men from village taverns
 With their tankards, all the remnant of humanity
 Cast by some wave aloft in former vanity?

Glow within our earth a place of torment
 Deep and sulphurous, which outward smoking
 To the world is manifest and visible?
 Such may be Hecla, that Icelandic vent
 Whence issue spectral shapes of men provoking
 Fear in their living kin, who indivisible
 Saints from sinners in the dim terrestrial
 Billowings of vapour, dread their trial.

Granted this hell be local and material,
 How great its boundary, of what diameter?
 Certain schoolmen answer with precision,
 Twice a hundred miles Imperial
 Roman, now Italian; but says Demeter
 One Dutch mile, a spherical provision
 Divinely made by cubic calculation
 To hold the corpses damned of every nation.

Heed in such dispute calm reason saying
 Better it is to doubt of all things hidden
 Than be certain of uncertainties, revealing
 Confidently where is Abram's bosom, playing
 Like a pawn in chess theology, unbidden
 Summoning fire and brimstone, or unfeeling
 Bartering with limbo, hell or heaven
 Souls in agony, for ritual's windy leaven.

Purposefully then to ground returning
 Let me view the singular diversity

Of men and manners, their complexion,
Stature, disposition, ignorance and learning,
Custom, religion, riches or adversity,
Folly or judgment, impulse or reflection;
Whence these attributes, and are they fixedly
Fated, or still in their inception free?

Fortuitous as the stars in their variety
Made inconstant and unequal, without order,
Man is melancholic, merry, spendthrift, careful
In hourly handiwork as daily piety;
Many-coloured blooming as his garden border,
Bold in enterprise, yet of emotion fearful;
Swift of apprehension, using power
Wantonly as a horseman riding but an hour.

Man's the careless pattern of our planet
Spread unruly in the fold of valley,
Hill and plain, with cottage, castle, manor;
His the panoply of spire from granite
Tower springing, city wall and alley,
Fortress keep and ragged pride of banner,
Ship in narrow sea or desert ocean,
Haven her intent but man's her motion.

His this bridled earth of field and coppice,
Dale and farmstead, hedgerow, millstream;
His the river-banking, ditching, draining
Sea-salt pasture; wheat and poppies
Waving, orchard laden, face of coal-seam;
His the bridging, tending and maintaining
Nature for his handmaid, never mistress
Save in her yielding, smiling and resistless.

Out of England's garden with the single
Shadows of her trees in pasture standing
Sheep-encircled, let me over Channel
Speeding, look on Netherlands where mingle
Hedgeless plots rectangular expanding
To the highways' limit, in a panel
Framing the unknown husbandman's ambition
Prodigal of toil to win a scant fruition.

A JOURNEY THROUGH THE AIR

Then by forests and calm rivers winging
Southward, let me scan with eager eye
Green serrated terraces, from a callous
Dry declivity by man's ardour wringing
The ultimate blood and secret treasury
Of the vine, a plant that with the aloes
Of a bitter heart can never amply flourish,
Being cordial as the sun, and quick to nourish.

Shall I willingly by wildernesses flying
Quit this haunt of friendly man whose mystery
Deepest in creation lies, or circling mountain
Crag and cataract, spread wings defying
Him their master through a history
Long erect in pillar, dome and fountain?
He in his turn will soar aloft—by stages
Wresting his engine from some later ages.

THE MELANCHOLIA OF BURREN

BY GEOFFREY GRIGSON

ONE looked down from the rear of the ruined church on to the green, flat hay meadows around a farmhouse protected by ash trees, themselves a clear green of another shade. The meadows and the ashes were a triangle of colour wedged into the grey pavements of limestone which rose on either side, and rose again and again in dry terraces, desert surrounding life.

Nothing could less resemble, near or far, the Western Ireland of railway posters. The scale—the low, wide scale—the colour, the formation—all are different in Burren. There are no streams save one, though here and there a small lake lies in the grey. The water sinks down into systems underground; and for drinking the rain must be stored off the thatch. Yet Burren supports plenitude of life. It always has. I put a hand in through a hole into a stone tomb, a regular, Christian cromlech, in the unroofed chancel, and felt a dozen poundnesses and pulled out one of them—a skull, with some traces of skin or muscle still tough around one eye-socket. The dead of all ages lie round among the living throughout all the hills, the limestone plateaux, the dry valleys of Burren. Leg bones and skulls lie, open to the weather, under the white chervil of the burial yards around many such roofless medieval churches. There are low, huge cromlechs by the score on the smooth limestone, hidden by the hazel scrub. There are raths and cahirs; there are rectangular towers, like single decayed teeth, the fortified homes of the Irish gentry of Burren in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, each with one wall blown out by Ireton's orders: under such a ruin may perhaps be a grass-grown cahir within which the family lived in earlier times, or a small thatched farmhouse with its outbuildings. And perched out of the ivy on the highest piece of stone-work of the tower a wind generator swings round and gives the farm electric light and current for a wireless set.

Limestone makes good pasture wherever there is soil over the rock, good grazing. Cattle are driven into Burren for the winter grass, and driven off fat in the spring. The farms in Burren are neat, the small houses well built and cared for; in fact, the limestone is, and has been always a good environment for man. An Irish dispensary doctor told me that the dry limestone dwellers differ in greater alertness, health, and economic well being from those who live a mile or two away on the sour, heavy, cotton-grass peat of the shales and coal-measures. The bones lies among the chervil, a new post-revolutionary tombstone, neatly inscribed in black Irish lettering, stands in the nave, the creamery

van collects the milk by the churchyard gate, rusty and difficult to open, and the children guide iron hoops down the road, and the whirling vanes of the wind-generator creak and moan; and one feels as in few parts of the British Isles, the living intermixture of past and present.

One feels, as Ruskin felt whenever he left England and looked again at the old tower of Calais Church, "that agedness in the midst of active life which binds the old and the new into harmony." "We in England," said Ruskin, "have our new streets, our new inn, our green shaven lawn, and our piece of ruin emergent from it—a mere *specimen* of the Middle Ages put on a bit of velvet carpet, to be shown; but on the Continent" (and he might have said in Ireland) "the links are unbroken between the past and present; and in such use as they can serve for, the grey-headed wrecks are suffered to stay with men."

It was partly in Burren, in the hamlet of Leana, among the hazels under a long, grey escarpment, that American anthropologists investigated the Irish way of life; and from their findings, described by Dr. Arensberg in *The Irish Countryman*, one understands the continuity of a thousand and more years, the system of kinship which continues, and why the villages are simply kinship centres of distribution, with the name of the family rather than the function of the shop displayed above the long glass windows. One realizes how ignorant the English landlords must have been that there was an Irish way of life, how the alien wall of ignorance which separated landlord and tenant was higher than any wall around the demesne. "Faith, gentlemen," says the agent to the landlords in William Allingham's remarkable poem, "Laurence Bloomfield in Ireland":

Faith, gentlemen, this country sorely needs
A quicker clearance of its human weeds;
But still the proper system is begun,
And forty buildings we shall change to one.

But the Irish of the West have survived the landlords and the agents; and the "physique" of Burren means that the life can be modified, but hardly revolutionized and severed from its living, if weakened, tradition.

In one village or another, alongside the roofless church, will be a modern one, with much polychrome adornment, built with funds from the Irish Catholics of America; but still the ruin retains its sanctity. It may be scheduled, according to the iron notice nailed into the wall, as an ancient monument, but the ruin will become more ruinous, the churchyard will grow wilder, after a few last old people have claimed their right of burial within it, or within the church; and at last, ancient monument or no, the church will collapse, simply because the past is not antiquarian in Ireland, because it lives in the Irish, because the Irish peasantry feel no need to stabilize, and preserve, and shave and repoint a past from which they still have not been separated. In Kilfenora, in Burren, a village with wheel-cross, a fort near-by surrounded (like the celebrated fort on the Aran Islands) with *chevaux de frises* of pointed fragments of limestone, and with a ruined Cathedral, partly used (and locked) as a Pro-

tant church, I watched a cinema show one evening in June. The cinema in a waggon, a show waggon painted red and blue; and from the waggon the film was projected into a tent, until the vast voice of Gracie Fields came to the stone ears of the bishops lying, in the ruined part of the Cathedral, in just such a scene for detail and surface of stone, for decay, and for black maidenhair in the joints, an umbellifer in the corner, and empty tracery in the wall above, as Cotman was able to paint a hundred and fifty years ago in Norfolk. At the cinema comes on wheels—and goes. Just as a fair comes and goes. At a funeral, or a cattle market, Kilfenora is full; for the cinema and the alien antics of Gracie Fields only the tent was full.

The scenery is not uniform in Burren. Life and death are uniform, even if the life is more scattered in some parts. Limestone is uniform. Everywhere you find the wide magenta eyes of *Geranium sanguineum*; but the endless scrub of hazel bushes one gets inland only and away from the sea. Nearer to the sea, nearer to Black Head, the limestone gets bolder, at least to the distant eye, the hills more striated by their terraces, and more deathly. Inland many little gorge-like valleys are cut out below the pavements, below what in Yorkshire are called the "clints" of limestone and, upon the walls of these valleys, elder trees grow out of clefts tall and close against the rock. I think of the escarpment above Leana where these cleft-elders cling in patch after patch to the vertical limestone, giving a delicious heartening contrast of growth against the ungrowing.

Not so far away, at Kilcorney one may lean one's back against the last stump of a church wall and look across the dry floor of the valley to a tall cliff, softened with elder trees and pierced under their green with the black entries into caves. As the road curves up out of this particular valley, at the western end, a quick eye will see something unusual in the vegetation, something which upholsters the limestone and hangs down towards the ditch. The unusual, a wide spread of *Dryas octopetala*, foretells the appearance of Burren on its seaward slopes. Inland the *Dryas* covers only a patch here and there; facing the sea it is almost universal from near sea-level upwards. And a good plant this, in its flowers, white and gold-centred, in its fruiting stage with long reddish, silken awns twisted round in a bunch, in its leaves, precise, clenched and regular, lifting the rock or the soil. *Dryas* ought not to be in Burren: it belongs typically to the sub-arctic lands around the Pole, to the rocks below the blue ice which covers Greenland, to Siberia, or else to highish mountains; and, with other plants abundant in the wrong place, *Dryas* is an element of Burren's peculiarity.

I shall mention of these others, the spring gentian, which properly is an alpine; and which I first saw like the flash of a sapphire ring lost in the grass as a car took me quickly along the sea road from Ballyvaughan around Black Head. Its colour is deep and clear enough for one to be able to pick it out in that way, pick out a mere single flower in the grass, as one goes by at forty miles an hour. The spring gentian is one of several flowers, most of them blues,

whose colour seems to have depth, like the colour coming from a jewel stone. Others I can think are the blue Navelwort, *Omphaloides cappadocica*, growing out of the shaded earthmould of gardens, and another borage, the groomwell *Lithospermum purpureo-coeruleum*, glittering in the undergrowth of the edges of woods on the Mendip limestone. There are mosses which achieve such an effect of coloured light in green or in gold. I have never seen *Schistostega osmundacea*, "a most lovely little moss sometimes illuminating the caves where it grows with a golden light, from the refraction of its young succulent confervoid threads," but one does not have to go far to see in the winter (as Samuel Palmer saw it in Kent) *Tortula ruralis*, its green tufts alight on the old thatch of a barn or a waggonshed. A neon light spreading its blue on to the particles of fog in Piccadilly Circus occurs to me, too, when I think of such plants.

It is the flora, dryas, gentian, maidenhair fern, and all the rest, so well described by R. L. Praeger in *The Way that I Went* (a very necessary book for finding out the best in Ireland, in flowers, antiquity, and in scenery), which bring to Burren such visitors as the district receives; and to Black Head they go, and I suspect not much further into Burren; which is no place for the average in taste. More people still just see the bare low outline of Burren as they cross over from Galway to the Aran Islands, where the flowers of Burren are repeated and which lie only a few miles off Black Head, flats of limestone blue in the deeper blue of the Atlantic. There are not good communications with Burren. It is divided by no bus route. There are few trains on the light railway which skirts it on the South, running from Ennis through Corofin (near Corofin, on the ruined church of Kilnaboy there is a fertility figure, a *Sheila-na-gig*), and then off through the coal measures and the bog to Leinch and the rest of the little brown watering places of County Clare. My own first entry, by road from Ennis, through clouds of limestone dust, between limestone walls footed with dust-gray plants, was not heartening.

And later that day the barometer of the heart dropped a bit more when I climbed by a boreen up the hill from Kilnaboy on to the more or less level table of limestone across which rolls of low ranked clouds were moving, and dragging with them grey slanting patches of rain. A sell, I thought. And I knew, for example that Burren was not an area of caves like the limestone of Yorkshire or Fermanagh. There are caves in Burren, such as the ones I have mentioned. But few of the caves in that valley of Kilcorney afford more than a dry, elder-framed entrance. Fifty feet and the cave is blocked by mud. Praeger says in *The Way that I Went* and again in his *Botanist in Ireland* that one should view the great cavern of Poolnagollum under the 'mountain' of Slieve Elva. But view it, from above, is all one can do. Poolnagollum to this surface view, is a pothole of the Yorkshire kind, a dark descent in which ash trees and mountain ashes grow up from the depth to the wall guarded lip, around which, as around the Yorkshire pot-holes, droop the

ver-coloured flowers of the water avens. But there is no way down to its miles of tunnel, without aid. I walked round it, thinking that perhaps there was a concealed path. Then an Irishman came walking across from his farm below Slieve Elva in bright Sunday boots. Could one get into the cave? One could. How? I'll show you. It was easy. And he pointed down the steepest part where no path, no footholes were visible. Ah, he said, its easy, but you need ropes.

No, it takes a little time, a little patience, and a little travelling for Burren to begin to reveal itself. One needs an eye for the structures of rock, a taste for leg-bones among chervil, for medieval crucifixions and wheel-crosses, for raths, cahirs, castles, cromlechs, and Irishmen and plants, for as I say, life in death; for something more, in fact, than the obvious drama of white cabins on green grass under big black mountains with blue mountains small in the distance. One needs really to live inside Burren. If one is a botanist, one may as well take Praeger's advice in *The Botanist in Ireland* and stay at Ballyvaughan, or even south-east of Burren in one of the sun-parlour and steel chair hotels of the improbable town of Lisdoonvarna, where the priests of Ireland and others come to perambulate and drink the waters, which smell, as one lifts the cup, of an exceptionally bad egg mixed with suds from a blocked sink-pipe. Lisdoonvarna has the fascination of the ugly hotels, the peasant-priests, the waters, the season; the fascination of a spa occurring all of a sudden in a drabness and dampness of turf; but it is on the coal measures, and not in Burren at all.

The thing would be to find a farmhouse in central Burren, surrounded by limestone and hazel-scrub, perhaps a farmhouse in my valley of caves—there are several there, on either side of the remnants of the church—where one could either camp or find a bed. Living in Burren in that way, its felicity and its hardness, its sombreness under cloud, its electric colour in sunshine, particularly in low sunshine coming out under heavy cloudage, would soon enough be felt; and it would not be many days before some evening one experienced that strangest of effects on Burren—the limestone—plateau and hill—reflecting the pink off the clouds, and becoming, suddenly mile upon mile of pink rock. Wet limestone shines sometimes with the intensity of glacier or snow when the sun comes out again, but when the limestone is wet and the sky, or the clouds are pink, then one no longer believes in the dreariness of the battleship grey of Burren, no longer believes in Burren's melancholia. Moreover, in Burren, one must do one's own exploring. Botanically, it is well described; but for the best valleys the best ruins, such caves as there are, the cromlechs, the cahirs and the raths, all guide books to Ireland that I have seen are useless. Burren is not Killarney or the Twelve Pins of Connemara, and unless one can help oneself to some of Westropp's archaeological papers on County Clare or to one or two early nineteenth century books, one must fall back upon information from the farms and the villages and upon an ordnance map which does

not mark a tithe of the things to see—does not mark even the pot-holes under Slieve Elva.

Before I forget, I must mention one more plant of Burren, again a universal plant, inland and by the sea; for though one does not have to go to Ireland to see it, though it is not a rarity, it is a delicacy; and one which constantly sweetens one's progress among the rocks, which one constantly sees level with one's nose in climbing from terrace to terrace. And thinking of it now does one as much good as thinking of the dryas or the spring gentian. The plant is the mountain everlasting (*Antennaria dioica*). Its leaves are white, with the backs silvery and tinged with pink. The many flower heads to a plant are a suffused pink, a few inches off the ground. Compared with it, compared with a colony of mountain everlasting on the hard limestone, *Edelweiss* is a plant manufactured with a pair of scissors and a piece of flannel.

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

THE THIRD PROGRAMME

BY PHILIP MORRIS

TO illustrate what was envisaged when Sir William Haley, Director-General of the B.B.C., advanced the first tentative suggestions for a third programme, Mr. Harold Nicolson may be quoted. Describing an incident which occurred just previously, he wrote :

When I was a member of the Board I strove for long to obtain a short period for poetry reading; in the end I obtained my desire; but when I opened the *Radio Times* I found that this unpalatable item had been tendered to the listener under the matey title "V. for Verse". In response to my enraged protests this title was subsequently altered. But the incident was for me instructive. It convinced me that our vision was becoming bifocal and therefore blurred; it convinced me that something must be wrong if the British public (inheritors of the greatest literature that the world has ever known) must have their poetry presented to them as if it were castor-oil in a spoon; it convinced me that one could never cultivate the public by pretending that culture was something else.*

Well in advance of the end of the war, the B.B.C. made public its plans for, as it was described, a minority programme, its purpose to give listening of a higher cultural standard than any hitherto achieved. This promise, pretentious as it seemed at the time, was received with a certain amount of cynicism by those to whom such a venture would appeal, and the fear was expressed that it would simply result in the Home Service being robbed to provide for its new brother. Could the B.B.C., which had become increasingly servile to the masses, really take and succeed in this bold step? The continued non-appearance of the new programme long after it was expected did nothing to give assurance that the B.B.C. was not wavering in its intention.

In the autumn of last year a definite statement of policy was made by the B.B.C., and on September 29 the Third Programme was started. It was apparent that what Mr. Nicolson has called an "oily, unctuous coating of compromise" was to be lifted from mature programmes. In the Third Programme, no ground would ever be given for such criticism as applied to "V. for Verse".

To Mr. George Barnes was given the task of completing the plans. For six hours each evening, it was decided, there would be broadcast a programme devoted to music, drama, features, talks, poetry readings and short stories. No series would exert their ramping influence, and plays would be given in full regardless of length. A generous measure of repetitions, both recorded and "live", would be allowed. Broadcasts of foreign origin would be freely drawn upon, and an international spirit would be fostered in other ways.

When the first week's programmes were published they were impressive enough to dispel any fears of paucity. The most frequent complaint to be heard, indeed, was that of inability to listen to all that one wanted to hear. It is difficult to think of any other innovation of equally far-reaching influence to find such favour, but it must not be forgotten that on the whole the vocal sections of the public were confined to those who were more interested in the success of the experiment. It is unfortunate that owing to technical difficulties the programme still cannot reach all parts of the country as was

* From *The Third Programme*. Published by the B.B.C.

at first hoped, and it will be interesting to watch for any general change of attitude when the coverage is increased.

Now that the Third Programme has been in existence for more than eight months it is time to measure its achievement. Music comes first in this consideration, because of all the arts it is the one which takes most naturally to the air. It only requires to be well chosen and well performed. For these reasons, it occupies more than half of the programme time. As for the choice, it is evident that care has been taken not to overlap with the Home Service by avoiding popular works unless the performance is of special interest. Visiting artists are welcomed for their own sake, and have shown a commendable willingness to avoid the programme of favourite "draws". There is M. Pierre Fournier, who played the wonderful unaccompanied 'cello suites of Bach, and Renata Borgatti who gave a model performance of the "48" over a period of several weeks. Things for which the Third Programme is to be profoundly thanked are these and similar collections of works which should be heard within memory of each other for their full significance in relation to the composer to be understood. Other examples are the Beethoven Quartets which were broadcast complete in one week by the Löwen-guth Quartet of Paris, and the series of concerts in which Dame Myra Hess played all the piano concertos of Mozart. What is so reassuring about the Third Programme to an experienced listener is the fact that it takes for granted that these things are of sufficient importance to be worth doing well: there is no niggardly duty run-through of a work or two, announced with that air of having done the composer proud which was irritating when one had to rely upon the Home Service.

In the field of dramatic music, it is encouraging to note that not only is an opera broadcast almost every week, with a repeat, but that a number of unusual works have been given which one could never hope normally to hear. Such are: Busoni's *Turandot*, Debussy's *Pelléas*, Moussorgsky's *Boris*, Smetana's *Dalibor* and *The Secret*, Strauss's *Der Rosenkavalier*, Verdi's *Falstaff* and Glinka's *Ivan Susanin*, some of which were broadcast from their native land. It is a matter of heated opinion whether those "specially arranged for broadcasting" weather their journey across the air the more successfully, but this is an old problem and one which the Third Programme has yet to solve.

A note may be added with regard to modern British music, which, it will be remembered, received great prominence during the war. It is noticed that the B.B.C. is wisely redressing the balance by showing a marked interest in those foreign composers whom we had begun to place in the "unfulfilled promise" class through not hearing enough of them. Hindemith, Schönberg, Berg, Bartók and late-Stravinsky have been rediscovered for us in quantity, and with good purpose. And the quite new idea of using the large library of recorded music as a medium for comparison of interpretations has proved interesting, though more time could profitably be devoted to it.

The attitude of the drama directors towards lengthy plays was shown very early in the history of the Third Programme, for in the first week Bernard Shaw's *Man and Superman* was given twice in full. This was unique not only for the unprecedented length of the broadcast, but also because the second of the two performances was given "live", and not from a recording of the first, as had become usual. This practice has been followed several times since, resulting in greatly improved repeat performances. Although drama does not take a large proportion of time, a rare collection of plays has been broadcast, the international nature of which is indicated by the following list: *Agamemnon*, *The Frogs*, *Hippolytus*, *Peer Gynt*, J. G. Borkman and *Huis Clos* in translation; *Dr. Faustus*, *Romeo and Juliet*, *Troilus and Cressida*, *Richard II*, *Comus*, *Hassan* and *The Adding Machine*. Mr. M. R. Ridley explains in his article in *The Third Programme* that Greek drama is peculiarly suitable in structure for broadcasting,

no doubt further translations will follow. One of the best of specially written plays is Clifford Bax's *The Buddha*, which has been given two performances. The Third Programme is used for experimental drama, but this has up to now proved disappointing; the outstanding event, Mr. Louis McNeice's *The Dark Tower*, was originally a Home Service production.

Poetry in the Third Programme has attracted a reader of distinction known primarily as a poet. Mr. Dylan Thomas's musical and precise voice has been a feature of the poetry programmes right from the start. French poetry has been represented in programmes which included M. Pierre Emmanuel and M. Paul Eluard reciting their own works. The critics have their place in the serial survey of contemporary verse, "The Poet and his Critic", which feature has produced some penetrating if restrained comment. The poet is assured of the last word.

There is little space in an article to do more than mention the talks, covering, as they do, a wide range, but among them politics and science have been rather abstract and are well represented. In a different class, three talks come to mind for their excellence: Theodora Bosanquet on Henry James, Anthony M. Ludovici on Rodin, and James Stephens on James Joyce. Mr. Stephens, especially, ought to be given the freedom of the air more often: each of his rare broadcasts has been a delight. It remains to be seen whether this wholesale dissemination of culture will attract more listeners than it has done up to the present. I think it will. Let Milton and Monteverdi be broadcast, and let them be broadcast often and without apology or hint of condescension. This is the way of the Third Programme, and surely it is the right way.

CIANO'S DIARY 1939-43. Edited With an Introduction by Malcolm Muggeridge. Heinemann. 21s.

The Italians have a common phrase—*proba del altro mondo*—to signify some outlandish story or episode which is beyond the range of normal experience. For a non-Italian—or, at any rate, 'Anglo-Saxon' reader of the twentieth century this term is the only appropriate one for the *olla podrida* of fawning and braggadoccio, naïveté and treachery, pettiness and spite which is revealed in Count Ciano's memoirs. As a portrait of Mussolini the Diary is unsurpassable—all the more vivid and effective because the writer never intended originally that it should be published in the present form.

The author himself stands revealed as a typical Renaissance figure, astute but utterly amoral, intelligent but without characterless. That he rated (as the Americans say) higher than the playboy of contemporary legend this book certainly proves. And in its own genre it is important. For, while there is little in the way of revelations, now that so much has

been brought to light about the period covered, the Diary supplies just those details of verisimilitude which will enable historians to see in proper perspective the relations of the Axis partners, the measure of Italy's unpreparedness for war on the Nibelungen scale imposed by Hitler, the extent of General Franco's subservience to our enemies up to the turning-point of the Battle of Britain, etc.

When the curtain goes up Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax are about to arrive in Rome. Instructions are given to Starace (then Secretary-General of the Party) to soft-pedal on press comment until they have left. At the same time the welcome to be accorded to them must be "not too enthusiastic". Ciano's verdict after the first conversations is characteristic—"Effective contact has not been made. How far we are apart from these people. It is another world."

The drama opens with the German (Ribbentrop) initiative to transform the anti-Comintern pact into a thorough-going German-Italian military alliance—which Ciano resisted, he tells us, for more than a year. Mussolini himself is shown

as irresolute and vacillating. Finally, in May 1939, in a moment of pique, he agrees to the "Pact of Steel". But the Pact included a clause stipulating that for a period of three or four years neither Italy nor Germany would create embarrassment capable of disturbing the peace of Europe. For Ciano, as Italian Foreign Minister, that was the crucial point, the touchstone. In August 1939 he was summoned to a Conference with Ribbentrop at Salzburg and found to his dismay that, completely disregarding that proviso, the Germans were going ahead with their action against Poland. "Berlin gives us absolutely no information . . ." is the constant refrain.

Mussolini more than once speaks in tones of utter contempt of the Italian people; he reveals himself in the evening of his days as the completely opportunist *condottiere* that he had always been—*pace* the great and wise, including Rabin-dranath Tagore, who had voiced approval of him in his epoch of glory. His was a tragedy of frustration. We see him here all the time furiously jealous of Hitler and the German war machine; as Mr. Sumner Welles records in his Foreword, "'action' was the only spring to which Mussolini's nature responded." The climax was that other Salzburg Conference of April 29, 1942, graphically described:

Hitler talks, talks, talks, talks. Mussolini suffers—he, who is in the habit of talking himself and who, instead, has to remain practically silent. On the second day, after lunch, when everything had been said, Hitler talked uninterruptedly for an hour and forty minutes. He omitted absolutely no argument: war and peace, religion and philosophy, art and history. The Germans . . . have to endure it every day, and I am certain there isn't a gesture, a word or a pause which they don't know by heart. General Jodl, after an epic struggle, finally went to sleep on the divan.

Mr. Malcolm Muggeridge pens a pungent Introduction. He sums up the Diary's value as providing "one more record, incomparable in its *naïveté*, of how futile a pursuit is power, and how certainly those who pursue it become enmeshed in their own deceptions and stratagems." Yet

one wonder sometimes whether such an appreciation in moral terms would be met with anywhere outside the British Isles!

WILLIAM RYDAL.

THE MASTERS AND THE SLAVES: A Study in the Development of Brazilian Civilization, by Gilberto Freyre. Translated by Samuel Putnam. *Secker & Warburg*. 35s.

Brazil for all its size and population must not be taken as altogether representative of the whole of Latin America since it alone has a Portuguese background, it alone escaped civil wars in the nineteenth century by stabilizing in the form of an empire and absorbed a high percentage of Negroes into its racial and cultural make-up. Nevertheless, Brazil shares many conditions with its neighbours.

Thus Gilberto Freyre, a "pure white" sociologist trained in the U.S.A., reveals characteristics which we find in most cultured Latin Americans: great erudition, an intimate knowledge of the European background, a certain ironical detachment, a predilection for sex, a boldness in the exploration of native life and problems too vast and contradictory as yet to be precisely systematized. With this, a feeling of urgency; with so much still to be discovered and described, it could hardly seem to him worth while taking time to tighten and polish.

The Masters and the Slaves is the first of his important sociological studies to be translated into English. The translation is masterly. Mr. Putnam has taken infinite pains as his own footnotes and his bibliography added to those of the author's show. With this work begins a series of essays in which Gilberto Freyre has undertaken "to study the formation and disintegration of patriarchal society in Brazil, a society that grew up around the first sugar-mills or sugar-plantations established by Europeans in our country, in the sixteenth century." The book deals therefore chiefly with the north-eastern region, that of Pernambuco, where the author

himself was born in 1900. Here the patriarchal system based upon latifundary and slave-holding mono-culture found its most characteristic expression.

Three ethnic and cultural groups went to the system: the Portuguese, pre-conditioned less by their other over-seas ventures all of a completely different type, man because they had always hovered between Europe and Africa; the native Indian who above all through his women-folk contributed a great deal of local knowledge and practical skill; and the Negro who with the sugar-cane, both so ideally suited for the American tropics, first arrived in 1532.

Gilberto Freyre points out that the Indian's inadaptability to the heavy agricultural work on the plantations was due to the backwardness that kept him a nomad and left hard monotonous work to the women. The Negro, on the other hand, coming from a great variety of nations or stocks by no means all primitive, was a better plantation-hand.

Since the Portuguese arrived without women, miscegenation was universal. The Portuguese had no racial prejudices, a result partly of their contact with the highly cultured Moors. The only bar was religious; so the slaves were baptized on arrival.

In a country that had no riches to offer to the conqueror, sugar was the real wealth from the moment it became an object of luxury in the European markets at the end of the sixteenth century. And sugar meant the plantation-owner and the slave, because: "Only a method of colonization based upon large-scale property and upon slavery would have been capable of surmounting the enormous obstacles in the way of the European civilization of Brazil."

It is probably the author's most outstanding quality that he can view the consequences both good and bad without racial and social prejudices; he goes to the bottom of half-truths and examines the reasons. It is not the Negro who is corrupt and a corrupter, but the slave; the Indian dies only when forced into un-

healthy living-conditions; the half-breed is inferior because of a faulty diet and venereal disease; the white man goes to bits if his existence depends on the slave.

The bad features need not be permanent. Wherever inferiority exists, it is based on factors which science can subject to rapid change, or which will disappear with the social and economic system that created them. Slavery was abolished in Brazil as late as 1888, yet Gilberto Freyre can already assert:

We (the Whites and the Negroes) are two fraternizing halves that are mutually enriched with diverse values and experiences; and when we round ourselves out into a whole, it will not be with the sacrifice of one element to the other.

This goes far to explain why there is such a strong tone of optimism in the Brazil of to-day, paralleled among the Latin American republics perhaps only in Mexico where the mestizo bred of Indian and White has completely asserted himself.

This work makes fascinating reading because of its lively tone and the great variety of subjects touched. The vast material was gathered both by field-work and a close study of the written sources, family archives, diaries, and other private and official documents. The bibliography alone covers thirty-six pages. For all those interested in Latin America, one of the great reserves of civilization, this book is an indispensable guide.

LILLO LINKE.

DEEP ANALYSIS, by Charles Berg.
Allen & Unwin. 12s. 6d.

Psycho-analysis is still not considered 'respectable' in many scientific quarters and the lay public remains confused as to its nature, status, and relation to general psychology. Lay opinion is still prone to a conception of semi-magical cures of mysterious complaints and scientific opinion is prone to doubt or even scoff at the psycho-analytic theory of human personality and behaviour, while perhaps admitting the reality of its therapeutic success. The difficulties which hinder a fuller acceptance of theory and a better

understanding of what is involved in the technique of clinical psycho-analysis are in part inevitable. These difficulties themselves have their origin in something whose existence is denied—that dynamic system of emotional attitudes and relationships which is normally inaccessible to consciousness. One form these difficulties take is just a refusal to accept the fact that the adjective 'unconscious' means what it says and that an individual's normal behaviour is largely conditioned by forces of which in the ordinary course of events he knows nothing.

But the difficulties have undoubtedly been increased by a lack of generally accessible case material of a verbatim kind and by the understandable but rather unfortunate attitude sometimes taken up by analysts in the past to genuinely sympathetic but critical inquiry. Dr. Berg sets out in his new book to help to remedy this state of affairs. This is a commendable object. The book is a detailed account of a complete and apparently successful analysis. It will interest a wide public.

Dr. Berg accomplishes a number of important tasks. He makes plain in what psycho-analytic technique consists and shows clearly that the secret of the process lies in the relationship which develops between patient and analyst—the 'transference' as it is technically called. The use of this term derives from the fact that attitudes which once belonged to the patient's relationships with his first emotional objects—his parents—become 'transferred' to the analyst. The latter's technique consists essentially in his handling of this relationship, from its inception to its ultimate dissolution when its work has been done. From the author's description the analyst emerges as a tolerant, morally neutral, reliable and completely objective listener and commentator. He never criticizes the patient's attitudes or actions but carefully translates them in a way which enables the patient gradually to realize and accept the nature of his emotional difficulties and to work through

them *for himself*.

Secondly, Dr. Berg makes clear the fact that intellectual appreciation of problems or the mere recall of forgotten childhood experiences have in themselves no therapeutic efficacy. Relief of suffering comes through the patient's *emotional acceptance* of his own hidden infantile attitudes—so deeply antagonistic to the standards of his conscious adult life—and by his re-experiencing them in relation to his analyst.

Notwithstanding these merits, the book is open from the scientific point of view to a number of serious criticisms. There is clearly a good deal of oversimplification in it and in some respects it will be definitely misleading. Many analysts would certainly say that the analysis described was a relatively superficial one and that the author has no appreciation of what the word 'depth' really means in relation to analysis. In fact, it would be wise to assume that this it not really a verbatim account of Dr. Berg's analysis but a highly bowdlerized one. It must be said that the theoretical standpoint from which the book is written is both out of date and superficial. It is out of date because, although Freud's work has not been superseded, certain parts of it have now come into greater prominence than hitherto and the whole is beginning to be seen in a new frame of reference. It is superficial in that it does not do justice even to Freud's original formulations.

Despite its shortcomings, however, and considering the state of public ignorance regarding psycho-analysis, Dr. Berg's book should be welcomed as a step in the right direction. Readers fortunate enough to hear two recent broadcasts by an anonymous psycho-analyst in the B.B.C.'s Third Programme may agree that what is now wanted is a book which deals with the whole subject in as simple and yet as profound a manner as was adopted for these two brief talks.

BEN S. MORRIS.

THE JEW OF TARSUS, by Hugh J. Schonfield. *Macdonald*. 10s. 6d.

THE CHURCH AND HUMANITY, 1939-1946, by the Bishop of Chichester. *Longmans*. 8s. 6d.

Mr. Schonfield's argument is that Saul the Jew remained Saul the Jew all his life and that the Messiah he proclaimed was, to the end, the Messiah of Israel, Saul devoting his life to bringing the Gentiles into the fellowship of the spiritual Israel: a fellowship transcending the very idea of nationality and destined to form a world-wide brotherhood of man. Saul never regarded Jesus as God and was never a Trinitarian.

Mr. Schonfield brings to his task a considerable equipment of scholarship, a wide historical vision, an occasional engaging modernity of phrase and a conviction that being himself a Jew he can understand more naturally than any Gentile understand the working of the mind of the Jew of Tarsus.

The book falls into two parts: in the first, "Saul the Seeker", we are shown by a close study of Saul's background and upbringing that he was persuaded the coming of Messiah was imminent; how for a time Saul believed he was himself the Messiah but how the fact of the Resurrection compelled him to recognize it was Jesus, not himself, who was the Messiah; and how his experience at Damascus Gate convinced him he was the Envoy of the Messiah, in a category apart from and above that of any other leader or apostle and how this conviction, held in all humble sincerity, led to misunderstanding, jealousy and opposition which pursued him throughout his ministry.

The second part, "Saul the Envoy", expounds the ministry in these terms. It shows Saul, a truly gigantic figure in mind and spirit, wrestling and striving in a perpetual tension between on the one hand the contemporary political trends and events which largely favoured his work and on the other hand the conflicting schools of thought amongst the

Jews themselves which were a perpetual source of difficulty and hindrance. Saul's imperfections of character and tactical skill are no more glossed over than are his superb qualities.

The whole subject is treated in a context of careful historical documentation and Jewish doctrinal statement, but the author admits he often makes assumptions, in his view probable but admittedly not provable, of what were Saul's reactions and thoughts; but even those who may most disagree with many of these will find the book exceptionally instructive and stimulating. It will clarify for many readers much they may find obscure in some of the Pauline Epistles and give them an enhanced appreciation of one who, viewed from whatever angle, was one of the world's greatest men.

The selections from the Bishop of Chichester's speeches and sermons during the war years are all variations on one theme: that man owes his first allegiance to God, not to the State, and must think and act accordingly. From this angle, the Bishop discourses on the right approach to a variety of problems, some now past, some still with us: the treatment of refugees and internees, our attitude towards Germany as distinct from the Hitlerite State, and towards the 'resistance' minority within that State, towards a now defeated Germany and towards the unifying forces in Europe, etc. Convinced that all effective religion depends on Church membership and fellowship, the Bishop also has much to say about the need for a closer co-operation between the various Churches and is insistent that much has been done and more can be done by the Churches working together without waiting for a possibly distant doctrinal unity.

The Bishop writes with great clearness and conviction and from the experience of much devoted personal labour over long years, yet it must be said his statements never seem able to depart from an academic aloofness lacking personal warmth. Most readers will moreover wonder at the lack of any reference

to his own country's sufferings, or to the very relevant fact that Germany's propensity for oppression and aggression was manifested long before Hitler's rise to power in 1933. The speech which caused most discussion when made, a strong denunciation of our policy of obliteration bombing (House of Lords, February 1944) has only historical interest since Hiroshima revealed the nature of any future bombing; and it is interesting to find, in the first chapter, a detailed list of the clauses of the famous Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, 1685. Most of us know well enough what this broadly implied, but no more than that.

JOHN HALET.

DEFEAT IN THE WEST, by Milton Shulman. *Secker & Warburg*. 15s.

Major Shulman sets himself a threefold object—"to tell the story of the defeat of the *Wehrmacht* in the West, to suggest some of the causes that brought about that defeat, and, finally to show how men, great and small, react to the overwhelming psychological experience of defeat itself." As a corollary he warns us against the belief that superior material resources is a guarantee of victory, for even with all such advantages *man* can still lose wars.

As an intelligence officer on the staff of the Canadian Army it was Major Shulman's duty to make a detailed study of the German Army before D-day; he was in close contact with subsequent operations, and, after the war he was detailed to interrogate a large number of Senior German Commanders. He is therefore well equipped to achieve his objects and he has produced a very interesting book, all the better for avoidance of sensationalism.

Before passing to the story of the war in the west he describes the rebirth of the *Wehrmacht*, its characteristics and the stages by which it passed completely under Hitler's domination. He analyses the causes that brought about its defeat despite the fact that more than once its victory

seemed assured. He lists the opportunities lost, and the fateful decisions which German commanders variously considered to have been decisive, but he himself summarizes the causes of defeat as—Hitler, discipline and ignorance. Hitler's mad strategical decisions and centralized control were the prime causes and after the elimination of Fritsch and Blomberg they were accepted, practically unchallenged, through a tradition of discipline carried to inconceivable extremes, blended with an astonishing ignorance of the situation either as affecting the enemy or the operations in progress. Nevertheless the plot against Hitler is shown to have been more wide spread than it appeared at the time to be; and its failure was perhaps the greatest disaster Germany suffered. Its success would not have enabled her to escape defeat, but it might have left her with a modicum of self respect and with leaders with legitimate authority.

The war in the west is described in considerable detail from the German standpoint, supported by many quotations from German documents and by statements made under interrogation. The actions of the Allies are only lightly sketched in but, particularly in the Normandy battle, it is clear how effectively they dictated developments; although Hitler's orders were mainly responsible for the completeness of the disaster. It is curious that although Hitler alone expected the invasion to take place in Normandy he subsequently was the last to be convinced that the main attack would not be made in the Pas de Calais, and refused till too late to allow reinforcements to be withdrawn from that area.

The worse the situation became the more did Hitler's control interfere with the steps his subordinate commanders considered necessary. The Ardennes counter-offensive was conceived and planned in detail in Berlin. Rundstedt realized that it could have no more than fleeting success and disclaims all responsibility for it. Many of the German commanders fought with courage and executive skill long after

ney had abandoned hope but Rundstedt alone emerges as a figure that deserves respect and admiration.

How completely German morale broke down at all levels in the final phases of the war is shown, and it is a sorry picture. The various interpretations of oaths taken to resist to the death" are grimly amusing.

Altogether this is a book thoroughly worth reading.

CHARLES GWYNN.

LIFE ON AN ICEFLOE, by Ivan Papanin. *Hutchinson*. 18s.

UNDER THE CARPATHIANS, by J. B. Heisler and J. E. Mellon. *Drummond*. 12s. 6d.

These two books tell us of life in what by very different means have become Soviet territories, for no one will query their ownership of the migratory icefloe

on which four indomitable men dwelt for a period of nine months, in 1937 and 1938, while the region described in the Carpathian book, better known perhaps to us as Ruthenia, became Soviet territory when this was suggested to the Czechoslovak Government at the re-establishment of peace in that part of the world.

The preparations for the North Pole expedition by Ivan Papanin and his comrades were undertaken with the greatest care; it was their concern to make their equipment as light as possible. The tent, including the bunks, weighed only fifty-three kilograms. Consisting of four layers, it was made very warm—between the two layers of thick tarpaulin they put two layers of eiderdown. The sleeping-bags were made of wolf fur. The clothing was of deer-skin, the caps of wolverine and underwear of the best merino wool. By the way, it was not possible for them to change this under-

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" And the temple of God was opened. . . . and there was seen. . . . the Ark (Chest or Box) of his Testament (or Will)".

" And round about the Throne were four-and-twenty Elders (Bishops) sitting. . . . (and they) fall down and cast their crowns (their wisdom) before the Throne".

— *Rev. xi.*, 19; *iv.*, 4, 10.

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wear more often than once a month, while dishes were washed about once in three weeks. The saucepans turned black, but the explorers had no intention of cleaning them, and this apparently did not cause any inconvenience, so that we may perhaps derive some lessons from these hardy fellows. They had various kinds of footwear, high waterproof boots, big heavy felt boots which could be pulled over the high boots, and fine strong thigh-boots of deerskin. Not far from Moscow there was a kind of dress-rehearsal for the expedition. Here all the equipment was tested, to see how well the scientific instruments functioned, whether the tent would retain the warmth and how far the explorers were capable of preparing the food, which had been selected with the utmost care and included a great variety of vitamin commodities.

The scientific results of the trip were very important and the four men certainly earned the applause of their Motherland, which made them Heroes of the Soviet Union. Amid their strenuous life in that desolate region—Ivan Papanin himself writing each day the interesting diary which is the major part of this book—they had time for various diversions, such as chess, and when a challenge was received by wireless from the champion, Lasker, he was asked whether he would take on the four of them. And once every ten days they held a meeting to discuss current political matters, the wireless man having collected material of what was going on in other parts of the world.

There was at that time no question of what should become of Ruthenia, the easternmost province of Czechoslovakia which had been so neglected for the thousand years that the Magyars had ruled it, while the Prague authorities had in a few years wrought wonders for the very backward population. There is much affinity between the Ruthenians and the Ukrainians, which accounts for the willingness of the Czechoslovak Government to let Ruthenia be absorbed into the

Soviet sphere.

This very beautiful book gives an admirable account of life in that remote district; some of the quaint wooden churches were unfortunately destroyed in the war, but it is interesting to learn that Ruthenians who have prospered, comparatively, in the United States have had some of them bodily removed and taken across the Atlantic. The two authors tell us much that we cherish, so that the life of these people is brought home to us. For instance on St. Ivan's Day in January, when the mountain slopes are still deep in snow, open-air meetings are held for the transaction of very important affairs. This is the day when the officials for certain posts are selected—the village postman, the verger and, most important of all, the chief shepherd. His wages are fixed according to tradition and are mostly paid in kind, with maize and oats, milk and cheese. The book has the additional advantage of excellent illustrations.

HENRY BAERLEIN.

TRAVELLERS' VERSE, chosen by M. G. Lloyd Thomas with Lithographs by Edward Bawden. New Excursions into English Poetry Series. *Muller*. 10s. 6d.

Miss Lloyd Thomas says the verse in her anthology is by those "who have travelled in fancy or fact or in both," and this, I think, is misleading. At least, it misled *me*, for I thought that the travellers in fancy would be those who went voyaging into strange seas of thought like Coleridge in *The Ancient Mariner* and Shakespeare in *The Tempest*. But the travels in this book whether in fact or fancy, are restricted for the most part to those which could be traced on a map, though in one or two poems the earthly scene shines like a parable with unearthly meaning—Yeats's Byzantium, Spenser's Hierusalem, the omnipresent Palestine of Eliot's Magi, and glimpses of Milton's Satan-haunted globe. Most of the poems, however, are much more

undane, and in restricting herself in this way Miss Lloyd Thomas has helped to give a very individual tang to her selection.

The poems form a rather erratic journey round the world. Starting with several comments on those "motions unrest" which send men voyaging, we cross to the Low Countries, to Paris with a détour through Spain to the Mediterranean. Here we stay for a long time, are shipwrecked by Byron, visit Italy with Shelley, T. Moore, D. H. Lawrence, Clough, and Newman; go on to Greece, Constantinople, Persia (Coleridge's "Persian Eclogues"), and Egypt. Then down the length of Africa, over the ocean to India, China and Japan; across the Pacific via Australia and Hawaii to South America; up the continent to the States, and home by the North Atlantic in a sort of convoy-route which touches the sub-arctic.

The poems fall roughly into two classes. The first of these is that of travel notes, descriptive poems designed to be read by those who have been left behind. Such verse, naturally, is often slight, is always insular in outlook, and, indeed, is the global equivalent of the English topographical verse so admired by Mr. John Betjeman. Wit is a main characteristic of this type of verse, and in this selection it varies from the family-album humour of Thomas Lisle to the genius of Byron, which could easily have filled half the volume, if Miss Lloyd Thomas had not decided that no poet shall be allowed to "appear very frequently or at very great length."

In the other class the aim of the poet is not so much description as romantic evocation: strange landscapes are used as symbols for the unknown. The eighteenth century, as it may be expected, is rich in such verse, and the editor has found some delicious and unfamiliar examples. Here, for instance, is John Scott of Amwell, in his "Chinese Eclogue":

The distant prospects well the sight might please,

With pointed mountains and romantic trees:
From craggy cliffs, between the verdant
shades,
The silver rills rush'd down in bright
cascades;
O'er terrac'd steeps rich cotton harvests
wav'd,
And smooth canals the rice-clad valley lav'd.

Nor is it just the minor poet who can make use of guide-books and geographical studies, for near John Scott's garden we find Tennyson's "Enoch Arden" on his desert island, and Wordsworth's "Youth of Georgia's Shore," whose lines about the flowers that set the hills on fire and the islands like "spots of sky" were inspired by Bartram's *Travels*.

Among the more recent work in this volume we find a new type of travel poem emerging, one which is less conscious of home sweet home, one which is concerned with less description or evocation for the benefit of the reader, than with the poet's own attempt to understand the nature and character of his subject. A poem like W. J. Turner's *Australian Shepherd* gives us not just the experience of the poet but perhaps that of the place itself. And Alun Lewis bores deeply beneath all surface appearances to an understanding of India which is surely greater than that of most English politicians.

Miss Lloyd Thomas's anthology is full of substance and surprise. The illustrations, by Edward Bawden, remind me of a cross between railway posters and a child's memories of the Wembley Exhibition. They make me hope that Messrs. Muller will embark on a series of New Excursions into Art—anthologies of pictures, each selection with a commissioned comment by a modern poet.

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BOOKS ON THE TABLE

THOSE who echoed Winston Churchill's words in 1942 when he declared: "We have no wish but to see France free and strong with her empire gathered around her" and have since grown impatient with her handling of constitutional and political problems might read as a corrective *THE GERMANS IN FRANCE* by Jacques Lorraine, translated by A. G. Cerisier-Duvernoy (*Hutchinson*. 16s.). This is a sober account of Nazi plans for the Germanization of France and of how they nearly succeeded. The British, being saved the experience, can do no less than persevere with their understanding of and patience with France's worries, which are directly due to her ordeal at the hands of a people poisoned by the *herren-volk* myth. How these French, "the scum of Europe" as *Das Schwarze Corps* the official organ of Hitler's Black Guard called them, were to be classified and divided—"purified" is the German word—into near-Germans and slaves, is recounted in detail with the aid of quotations from German race theorists, poster proclamations and official documents of all kinds. The book's diagrams are especially illuminating in the assessment of what this procedure, unfrustrated, would have done not only to France but to the world.

Recording history

It seems a long time since the Vichy Government conscribed hundreds of thousands of French men and women to meet Hitler's demand for workers but actually it is less than five years ago. *THE SOUND OF THE TRUMPET* by Sarah Gertrude Millin (*Faber*. 16s.) sharpens the fading events of 1942 to 1943 in this the fourth volume of her war diary. Written as it was in South Africa its detachment from the scene of the struggle gives added value to her recordings. She has the sort of objectiveness which is a welcome astringent after a surfeit of those sentimental yearnings from afar in which so

many writers have indulged; for instance, her laconic references to the bombing of London earn the almost effusive respect of one of those Londoners who was bombed. Mrs. Millin's comment is rare and always shrewd and so free is the book of unpleasant personal bias that, with its forerunners and its successors, it should be one of the stand-bys of the future historian or student of 1939-1945.

"Blood on the coal"

In those days the coal miner for the first time came into his own, no longer part of a depressed class but as an individual who gave point to rhetoric about blood, sweat, toil and tears. The opinion of a boy of eighteen, who came new to mining and who is able to express himself, is particular refreshing now when unending disputes make the subject of coal ever more arid to the bewildered sympathizer. *BEVIN BOY* by Derek Agnew (*Allen & Unwin*. 7s. 6d.) is the story of one who, choosing the pits rather than the Forces, is still able to say that he would not have missed the experience. This is not to imply that he has no criticisms to offer. He makes an able case for his older colliery friends, fortified by statistics, and can be rueful about the plight of the 'Bevin boys'. He quotes in full the speech made in October 1945 in the House of Commons by the Member for Brighton, which ended on a significant note: "If these boys had been properly treated they might have become young ambassadors for the mining industry." Derek Agnew will take back with him into Fleet Street something to widen and deepen his range as a journalist. He might with advantage shed his facetious circumlocutions, for such mannerisms are no more attractive in the style of a 'Bevin boy' than they are in that of a leader-writer. And one small correction: if he turns to other pages in this issue of *THE FORTNIGHTLY* he will see that Mr. B. L.

ombes is not an ex-miner.

"you've had a busy day"

There is another section of the community for whom bouquets, medals and laurels are few. In *A NATION OF SHOP-KEEPERS* (Herbert Joseph. 5s.) Tom S. Whwell sets out the nightmares of dislocation, competition, monopolies, which meet the small private tradesman, already dogged by regulations and the necessities of rationing. As a Liberal the author does well to keep in mind the interests of the little-business man; the writer sees that Conservatives eulogise him only when they are "anti-co-op" and that Socialists, committed to nationalization, must inevitably crowd him out. The shopkeeper is not alone when he limits his interest in politics to what he thinks a candidate will do for him, but he is rather more to be excused than most. This book should hearten him; it should make him consider too if after all there is not a third way out of his difficulties, and it should be useful in rebuking his more grumpy customers.

Farming both hands

Not only juxtaposition makes mention of the next book appropriate: it is *THE URBAN FLAME* by Compton Mackenzie (Muller. 12s. 6d.) and is a survey of the gas industry in Britain, a public utility long since removed from the independence of a Samuel Clegg who "single-handed provided . . . going round with a ladder himself and lighting . . . the first installation of street lamps on Westminster Bridge." The author, with the evident curiosity manifest in all his books, must have enjoyed collecting the data for this one, and as usual he has imparted the enthusiasm to his reader. If this be propaganda would that such absorbing yet authoritative information, such 'human interest' with biographical concreteness, such *readableness*, might be required by all official propagandists. The many illustrations in colour each repay individual study in their variety—from quilt pies to steel plates, from parachute

ropes to sheep dip—and the whole is on a level with the finest of the 'documentary' films. On this occasion one disregards the possibly sinister implications of competition in the appearance of the book at this crucial moment—when electricity is in disgrace and when the switcher-on of a light knows the arch-criminal's guilt—and wallows in 'escapism', 'wishful thinking' and other delightful fantasies in the psychologist's *index expurgatorius*.

Three picture books

Another book which will interest small boys and grandfathers alike is one of three recent *King Penguins* (2s. 6d. each) by Gwen White, *A BOOK OF TOYS*. The drawings are mostly of those in the London museums and recall Saturday mornings in Kensington Palace spent by an infant Liberal with a hatred of glass cases, walking round and round Queen Victoria's toys with upstretched neck. The appeal of the book's script may be primarily to a child; nevertheless it conveys a good deal of erudition, the fruit of historical research covering some 5,000 years.—The next *King Penguin* is *ENGRAVINGS ON WOOD* by Thomas Bewick with a note on him by John Rayner. Bewick regarded woodcuts as "a department of the arts" and Ruskin sweepingly compared him to Botticelli and Paul Veronese. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries he was, as Mr. Rayner says, "an innovator who raised both the technical and artistic standards of his craft" and the numerous exact size reproductions in this book show how much he contributed to the expression of the English country scene and character. His birds, with every feather of the sea eagle or the peacock's tail scrupulously delineated, and his animals are all noble creatures.—Bewick seems not to have drawn flowers, and the third *King Penguin* supplies them for those readers who feel the lack. *FLOWERS OF THE WOODS* is by the Director of Kew, E. J. Salisbury. This is a valuable addition to the horticulture books of a Cockney with a passion

for rock gardening who fully intends to write a treatise herself on the subject. Meanwhile, here are pictures of woodland ancestors of some of the beauties in the rockery. *Scilla nutans* looking very mauve against the bright blue of the newest *campanulata* variety, *saponaria afficinalis* no less interesting than the cultivated *ocymoides*, gone with the snow alas, *anemone nemorosa* with less flaunting purple flowers than *pulsatilla* but with the same delicate leaves, are some of the many which, with the author's monograph, provide useful information on the habits of plants which thrive in the less sunny spots. A walk through the woods in early summer with Mr. Salisbury's book should prove equally rewarding.

Poems of a critic

Pine needles cover the silent ground:
 pine trees chancel the woodland ways.
 We penetrate into the dark depths
 where only garlic and hemlock grow
 Till we meet the blue stream
 cleaving the green
 twilight like a rhythmic sword.

as Herbert Read sings. His COLLECTED POEMS (Faber. 8s. 6d.) gathering together, as he says, in his introductory note, "all the poems that have previously been published in separate volumes" afford the opportunity to study his development in philosophy and emotion. His poems of two wars, the satirical verses, his lyrical poems and the eclogues indicate something of the self-discipline which moulded him into that literary and art critic who is considered to be one of the finest prose stylists now writing.

Translating atmosphere

GENEVIEVE by Jacques Lemarchand (John Lehmann. 7s. 6d.) may be called a prose poem by virtue of its having been translated by Rosamund Lehmann. How nearly she stays by the original is not known, though the dust-jacket states that "it is a work of extraordinary subtlety and force" by one of the most gifted of the younger generation of French novelists. Read at a sitting, it undoubtedly

gave the maximum amount of suspense, a sort of sustained shock, which takes all the subtlety and force of a Miss Lehmann to accomplish. The tale is of jealousy, the cruellest of diseases and usually the biggest bore to read about. But as Rosamund Lehmann is incapable of boring (witness a certain copy of *Dusty Answer* tattered with re-readings) the agonized love of two men for the same woman holds the betwitched interest to the end.

Social significance

The atmosphere of FLINT (Hammond, Hammond. 10s. 6d.), the last novel of the late Charles G. Norris, is not subtle. It has the saltiness and fogs of San Francisco's harbour and is noisy with the clashes between individualist shipowners and labour leaders. The conflicts convince because they are real; it is the stock phrases that are tiresome: "a bunch of reds" for all radicals, etc., though Byron Mackey is allowed some telling arguments for Socialism, not in this instance to be confused with Communism. The women in the book are a nuisance, cutting across the world of strikes and die-hard management which, while set in the 1930's, is still an engrossing topicality. The story tries to be a tract and a melodrama at the same time. Furthermore, it tries to put two points of view, which good little tracts never do.

When the "owners" crossed the Atlantic the prejudices went too. This reviewer, for example, was in Paris at the same time in June 1937 and interpreted Exposition manifestations differently. But their coming to England in the previous month for the coronation, listening to the "boy choir" in the Abbey and watching "England's proud nobility" stream out, is an endearing vignette, for itself and also for lightening this industrial case-book. However, as a statement of a way of life that is doomed, its theme is of more than historical interest at the present time.

GRACE BANYARD

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